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I EFFICIENCY AND LEGAL CERTAINTY VERSUS AUSTERITY 
This article is a revisited and expanded version of a previous 
study written in 2014 as a national report for the XV IAPL World 
Congress of Procedural Law: Effective Judicial Relief and 
Remedies in an Age of Austerity held on May 26-29, 2015, in 
Istanbul, Turkey.3 Much has changed in Brazil in the five years since 
this study was first published: there is a new Code of Civil Procedure 
(C.P.C./2015), a new political orientation in the Presidency, and, 
more specifically, a new economic orientation in the Ministry of 
Economy. 
This new political trend is reflected in the new justice system in 
Brazil. Brazil is going through a phase of political instability and 
possibly constitutional crisis. The Executive and the Judiciary are 
not aligned. For example, the Brazilian Supreme Court has been 
controlling the acts of the President during the COVID-19 
pandemic.4 The issues discussed in this article are related to the 
institutional development. We will mention the political situation 
merely in passing. The Judiciary maintains its independence from 




3 See Antonio Gidi & Hermes Zaneti, Jr., Brazilian Civil Procedure in the ‘Age 
of Austerity’? Effectiveness, Speed, and Legal Certainty: Small Claims, 
Uncontested Claims, and Simplification of Judicial Decisions and Proceedings, 
8 ERASMUS L. REV. 244 (2015). 
4 Fredie Didier Jr., et al., Brazilian Precedents in Covid-19: Supreme Court 
Matters, BART KRANS & ANNA NYLUND (EDS.), COURTS COPING WITH COVID- 
19 (forthcoming 2021) (discussing several Supreme Court decisions allocating 
power between the states and the federal executive). 
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to defend the Constitution and the laws. Despite the stress in the 
institutions, democracy continues to prevail in Brazil. 
These changes translate into a political agenda that is less 
concerned with broad access to social rights, and more focused on 
fiscal austerity and economic liberty. Among the many legislative 
changes that could impact this research, we must cite the social 
security reform (aimed at reducing the economic impact of the 
retirement of private and public workers)5 and the employment law 
reform (aimed at reducing the social rights of workers and 
increasing job creation).6 Additionally, several law reforms affected 
the public administration and the administration of justice.7 Most 
notably, amendments to the Introductory Act to Brazilian Law 
(introducing considerations regarding the concrete impact of 
administrative and judicial decisions on the economy)8 and the 
enactment of the Economic Freedom Act (creating rights of 
economic freedom, protection of the free initiative, and free exercise 
of economic activity, with the objective of stimulating investment 
and generating legal certainty through the de-bureaucratization of 
the public administration).9 
These winds of change dramatically shifted the landscape that 
led to our first study on this matter—a time when the justice system 
was seen as a “non-cost,” and the only concerns were legal certainty, 
the effectiveness of judgments, and the reduction of the caseload.10 




5 See GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL, http://www.brasil.gov.br/novaprevidencia/ (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2020). 
6 See Lei No. 13.467, de 13 de Julho de 2017, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 14.7.2017 (Braz.). 
7 See, e.g., Lei No. 13.655, de 25 de Abril de 2018, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 26.4.2018 (Braz.) (adding new provisions to Lei de Introdução às 
Normas do Direito Brasileiro); see also Lei No. 13.874, de 20 de Setembro de 
2019, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 20.9.2019 (Braz.); see also Lei 
No. 13.709, de 14 de Agosto de 2018, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
14.8.2018 (Braz.). 
8 See Lei No. 13.655, de 25 de Abril de 2018, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 26.4.2018 (Braz.). 
9 See Lei No. 13.874, de 20 de Setembro de 2019, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 20.9.2019 (Braz.). 
10 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 246. 
52 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:49 
 
 
which led to the tragedy of the commons of the Brazilian justice 
system, with more than 78.7 million lawsuits pending in 2018.11 
As this paper will demonstrate, Brazil now enters the age of 
austerity in civil procedure for two reasons: first, the economic 
situation in the country including the internal debt crises, and 
second, the infancy of the process of democratization and increased 
access to justice, which began in 1988 with the establishment of 
democracy and the enactment of the Constitution. In this generation, 
Brazil has considerably advanced access to justice by giving dignity 
to and recognizing the fundamental rights of thousands of Brazilians 
who were previously excluded from society, most notably those 
without education or financial resources to use the Judiciary in the 
protection of their rights. This breadth of access to the judiciary led 
to demobilization of the government in guaranteeing direct access 
to other public bodies and oversight of the regulatory agencies of the 
financial system, telephone services, and aviation.12 Curiously, the 
 
 
11 The updated 2019 Justiça em Números Report contains the main data from the 
Brazilian justice system in 2018, with detailed information about the 
performance of the Judiciary, specifically, its expenses, structure, and number of 
pending cases. See infra note 80. The Report has been published since 2004 and 
has consistently improved its methodology. Every unit of the system of justice 
(state and federal) collaborate sending data. The numbers show, for the first 
time, a reduction in the number of legal proceedings: excluding enforcement 
proceedings, the number of cases was reduced by 1.2 million cases, which 
represents a 3.3% reduction. This reduction happened in the past two years, 
while from 2009 to 2016 the cases rose an average of 4% each year. The 
numbers in 2018 are the result of a 1.9% reduction in the number of cases filed, 
combined with a productivity increase of 3.8%. In 2018, 28.1 million legal 
proceedings were filed, and 31.9 million were adjudicated. This represents a net 
result of 13.7% more cases concluded than new cases filed. This was the first 
time in a decade that all areas of the Judiciary were able to adjudicate more 
cases than were filed. All 24 Circuits of the Employment Courts achieved the 
same feat. The expenses of the Judiciary in Brazil in 2018 was 93.7 Billion 
Reals (roughly equivalent to $30 billion USD), an increase of 0.4% from 2017. 
As this paper was concluded, a new Report was published in 2020 with the 
information related to 2019. This article will mostly use the 2019 Report, with 
data of 2018. See Justiça em Números, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA 1 
(2018) https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp- 
content/uploads/2011/02/8d9faee7812d35a58cee3d92d2df2f25.pdf. 
12 See, e.g., Joaquim Falcão, Regulatory Agencies and the Judiciary , CONSELHO 
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, https://www.cnj.jus.br/agias-reguladoras-e-o-poder- 
judicio/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (considering the impacts of the regulation in 
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most common litigants, both as plaintiffs or defendants, are public 
bodies.13 The lack of direct support to the population and market 
control in turn, generates more pressure for access to justice through 
the Judiciary. The Judiciary, therefore, was a promoter of the re- 
democratization, but this change meant an increase in the cost of the 
administration of justice, which presented an obstacle to 
effectuating justice. 
Moreover, the Judiciary does not raise enough money. A recent 
study on judicial fees confirmed that the Judiciary operates at a 
deficit, that there is a huge imbalance between states regarding 
judicial fees, and that the fee structure encourages appeals.14 This 
information leads to the need to review the fee structure as well as 
the constitutional guarantee of free access to justice, which to this 
day, is conditioned solely on the self-declaration of financial need. 
Another difficulty in addressing the shift to austerity is the 
ambiguity of the expression “austerity,” which may have different 
meanings in different situations. For example, the expression is 
generally employed by economists for rigor in the control of public 
expenses by measures of control based on a sustainable level of the 
public deficit (“austerity-control”). In this sense, the fiscal reforms 
of the 2000s imposed rigid limits on expenses for the Judiciary and 
Prosecutors by linking them to the amount of taxes collected (Law 
101/2001, known as ‘Fiscal Responsibility Law’).15 However, this 
limitation was enacted before the current age of austerity and was 
not specifically directed towards the expenses of the judicial system, 






the judicialization of the consumer claims and asking “do agencies have any 
responsibility or contribution in the face of increasing judicialization?”). 
13 See 100 Maiores Litigantes, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (2012), 
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/100_maiores_litigantes.pdf 
(other major litigants are banks, insurance, and credit card companies). 
14 See DEPARTAMENTO DE PESQUISAS JUDICIARIAS, DIAGNÓSTICO DAS CUSTAS 
PROCESSUAIS PRATICADAS NOS TRIBUNAIS (2019) (Braz.) (available at: 
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp- 
content/uploads/2019/11/relatorio_custas_processuais2019.pdf). 
15 Lei Complementar No. 101, de 4 de Maio de 2000, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 5.5.2000 (Braz.). 
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Brazilian Judiciary is one of the most expensive in the world, 
accounting for roughly 2% of the Brazilian GDP.16 
Despite the economic potential and territorial dimensions of the 
country, Brazilian people have always been dependent upon the 
Public Administration. Additionally, because a major part of the 
population is not independent from the State, we experience the 
situation of “austerity-necessity.” A deficient public service, 
connected to broad access to justice, is one of the aspects discussed 
in this paper. 
This paper discusses judicial proceedings for the resolution of 
small claims, uncontested claims, and simple matters, from the 
perspective of the 2015 Code of Civil Procedure. 
The current relevant legislation in Brazil is, for the most part, the 
direct product of the 1988 Constitution (CF/88) and law reform 
pursuant to a political pact among the leaders of all three branches 
of government (“Republican Pact”). Signed in 2004, the Executive, 
Legislative, and Judiciary branches joined forces to promote a 
speedy and efficient justice system in Brazil.17 This pact led to the 
approval of Constitutional Amendment number 45 in 2004 (EC 
45/2004), which promoted a major reform of the Brazilian 
Judiciary.18 This initiative gave constitutional standing to the 
procedural objectives of efficiency (protection of fundamental 
rights, access to justice, and speedy trial) and legal certainty 
(stability of decisions and avoidance of contradictory decisions).19 
The 2004 Constitutional Amendment brought about several 
important innovations. One was the fundamental right to judicial 
protection at a reasonable time (Article 5, LXXVIII, CF/88).) 
Another important innovation was the “súmula vinculante” (Article 
 
16 Luan Sperandio, Why Is the Brazilian Judiciary So Expensive and Slow?, 
GAZETA DO POVO, https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/wiseup-news/why-is-the- 
brazilian-judiciary-so-expensive-and-slow/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2020). 
17 See Pacto Republicano de Estado por um Sistema de Justiça Mais Acessível 
Ágil e Efetivo, de 13 de abril de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
26.5.2009 (Braz.). 
18 See Emenda Constitucional No. 45, de 30 de Dezembro de 2004, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 31.12.2004 (Braz.). 
19 See Carlos Alberto Alvaro de Oliveira, Fundamental Rights to Effectiveness 
and Security in a Dynamic Perspective, 1 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 57 (2008) 
(discussing the compatibility between these fundamental rights and their 
importance for current civil procedure). 
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103-A, CF/88), a precedent-like statement enacted by the Brazilian 
Supreme Court (mostly a Constitutional Court) that binds the 
Judiciary and Public Administration.20 A third innovation was the 
prerequisite that all constitutional cases to be decided by the 
Brazilian Supreme Court have “general repercussion” (a kind of writ 
of certiorari to give the court control of its own docket) (Article 
102(3), CF/88). The Constitutional Amendment, therefore, created 
a new paradigm of efficiency and a new methodology for the higher 
courts in the Judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court.21 
After the system of precedents was established in Brazil, the 
Code of Civil Procedure of 2015 broadened and formalized the 
horizontal and vertical binding precedents. Trial judges and courts 
must follow their own precedents as well as the precedents of courts 
above them.22 
This article will address the reduced involvement of courts in 
family law, wills, and other areas of de-judicialization. It will also 
discuss special proceedings and procedural techniques, such as 
small-claims courts, monitory action, and in limine judgments, as 
illustrations of recent legal reforms regarding cases involving simple 
matters, the simplification of judicial decisions, and uncontested 
claims. It will also discuss changes brought up by the Code of Civil 
Procedure of 2015, including the importance of binding precedents 
and techniques for the aggregation of cases as a strategy for reducing 
repetitive cases and for increasing legal certainty. 
All these innovations stem not from austerity, but from the 
fixation of Brazilian civil procedure with the ideals of efficiency, 
 
 
20 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103-A (Braz.) (“The 
Federal Supreme Court may (…) issue a summula (restatement of case law) 
which, as from publication in the official press, shall have a binding effect upon 
the lower bodies of the Judicial Power and the direct and indirect public 
administration, in the federal, state, and local levels, and which may also be 
reviewed or revoked, as set forth in law.”). 
21 See Emenda Constitucional No. 45, de 30 de Dezembro de 2004, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 31.12.2004 (Braz.). 
22 See generally, HERMES ZANETI JR., THE BINDING VALUE OF PRECENDENTS 
(Juspodivm ed., 4th ed. 2019); MICHELE TARUFFO, IL VERTICE AMBIGUO, 
SAGGI SULLA CASSAZIONE CIVILE (1991); LUIZ GUILHERME MARINONI, 
PRECEDENTES OBRIGATÓRIOS (Revista Dos Tribunais ed., 3rd ed. 2014); 
DANIEL MITIDIERO, CORTES SUPERIORES E CORTES SUPREMAS, DO CONTROLE À 
INTERPRETAÇÃO, DA JURISPRUDÊNCIA AO PRECEDENTE, XIII REDP. 934 (2013). 
56 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:49 
 
 
legal certainty, and access to justice. The debate about austerity, 
which was previously nonexistent in Brazil, has begun. By 
expanding access to justice to a broader portion of society, the legal 
system increased both the number of cases and the costs associated 
with the judicial system. However, the excess litigation and 
expenses associated with the expansion of access to justice have 
contradictorily curtailed access to justice. This current situation 
requires new efforts to increase efficiency and legal certainty, while 
still maximizing access to justice. 
 
II AUSTERITY AND REDUCTION OF COSTS VERSUS 
EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGAL CERTAINTY 
Because austerity and the reduction of costs in the Brazilian 
justice system are not popular values, there was until recently, no 
open dialogue about them. Except for the above-mentioned Fiscal 
Responsibility Law in the 2000s,23 the subject of austerity in the 
Judiciary was practically non-existent in Brazil. When the original 
article was written in 2014, austerity may have been considered 
behind closed doors, but neither legal doctrine nor the annals of 
Congress make direct reference to it. It was clear that there was only 
a concern for efficiency and legal certainty, with total indifference 
to the problem of the costs of justice.24 As stated in the introduction, 
this approach has drastically changed. 
We must first discuss the general approach to reforming the 
administration of justice. Then, we will discuss the winds of change 
which landed within Brazil over the past five years. 
In recent years, most legal reforms of the Brazilian model of 
justice focused entirely on efficiency and legal certainty.25 
Efficiency means access to justice for the poor, judicial protection 
of individual and collective fundamental rights, and speedy 
proceedings.26 Legal certainty includes confidence in and the 
stability of judicial opinions, avoidance of contradictory decisions, 
 
 
23 See Lei Complementar N. 101, de 4 de Maio de 2000, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 5.5.2000 (Braz.). 
24 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 246. 
25 See, e.g., the aggregate litigation and the binding precedents discussed below. 
26 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 246. 
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and the indirect reduction of the burden on the Judiciary through the 
use of new techniques for the resolution of repetitive cases.27 
The movement towards efficiency and legal certainty are not 
antithetical, but complementary. The more people have access to 
justice, the higher the burden on the Judiciary, and the less efficient 
it becomes— therefore, the higher the burden on the Judiciary, the 
greater the need for efficiency. Legal certainty (for the reduction of 
contradictory opinions) and uniformity of decisions (to reduce the 
number of judicial proceedings) help people make decisions on 
whether to file or contest lawsuits. They allow habitual litigants to 
adopt responsible strategies to avoid litigation, which is particularly 
important in a situation where repetitive cases are emanating from 
both the public sector and some sectors of the private market. 
The access to justice movement, therefore, mandates law reform 
to increase stability and legal certainty. As we will see below, this 
relationship of cause and effect is clear in Brazil; as the legislature’s 
attention in encouraging access to justice has intensified, so has the 
need to deal with the overburdening on the Judiciary. This 
overburdening has worsened a “crisis” in the Brazilian Judiciary. 
Efficiency and legal certainty are the overall principles proposed as 
the solution for the “crisis” of the Judiciary. It is not clear, however, 
whether this scheme is sufficient or will lead to the expected results. 
Recent initiatives, directed at attaining both efficiency and legal 
certainty, have been pursued in small claims courts (because of the 
reduced value of the claim and lesser complexity of the subject 
matter) and simple and uncontested matters (cases without 
objection, or in which the legal conflict had already been previously 
decided by test cases or precedent).28 
To promote effective access to justice, Brazil created 
institutions specializing in the protection of collective and individual 
fundamental rights, broadening the functions of the Public 
Prosecutors (Ministerio Publico), and creating the Public Defenders 




27 Id. at 245. 
28 See, e.g., consumidor.gov (in connection with an ODR mechanisms connected 
with the small claims courts); see also Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 332, de 16 de Março 
de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.). 
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and free legal support for the poor in both criminal and civil 
matters.29 
On the other hand, recent initiatives have tried to minimize the 
negative impact brought by the increased access to justice. These 
initiatives have ranged from the adoption of biding precedents and 
aggregate litigation to the growing use of ADR. 
One strategy is to mandate a potential plaintiff to seek an 
amicable solution directly from the public body that caused the 
harm. Some court decisions have limited the broad access to justice. 
The Supreme Court made it mandatory for the plaintiff to 
administratively request a social security benefit before being 
allowed to file a lawsuit.30 The plaintiff, however, only needs to 
make a request; it is not necessary to exhaust the administrative 
procedure.31 
Another strategy to reinforce the multidoor judicial system is 
encouraging settlement. CPC/2015 established a mandatory 
procedural hearing in ordinary proceedings with the sole objective 
of conciliation and mediation.32 The party who does not appear will 
be fined (CPC/2015, art. 334).33 As technology has progressed 
judicial opinions have required consumers to go through online 
dispute resolution (ODR).34 ODR is conducted through the Ministry 
of Justice’s site consumidor.gov.35 This experience, in turn, led the 
National Council of Justice (CNJ)36 to study an agreement between 
the site and the small claims courts to legally mandate ODR 
proceedings before a legal proceeding could be filed.37 A pilot 
 
29 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 246. 
30 Id. at 248. 
31 Id. 
32 See Lei No 13.105, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.). 
33 Id. 
34 CONSUMER.GOV, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.consumer.gov (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2020). 
35 Id. 
36 See Gidi & Zaneti, Jr. supra note 3, at 248-49 (explaining the role of the 
National Council of Justice (CNJ)). 
37 CNJ recognizes that there is no impropriety in TJMA Resolution 43/2017, 
TJMA SOCIAL COMMUNICATION, 
https://www.tjma.jus.br/midia/tj/noticia/500837 (last visited Nov. 4, 2020) (Due 
to the success of the platform, the Supreme Court of the state of Maranhão 
decided that only after attempting to mediate through the platform one is able to 
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project in the First Circuit of the Federal Courts (including the 
Federal District and the states of Minas Gerais, Acre, Amapa, 
Amazonas, Bahia, Goias, Maranhao, Mato Grosso, Pará, Piaui, 
Rondonia, Roraima, and Tocantins) is already underway.38 
In both cases, judicial judgments have been reduced without 
curtailing access to justice.39 
Several initiatives have begun for the revision of the system of 
judicial fees and gratuitous judicial services.40 Until recently, Brazil 
was not concerned with the value of judicial fees. A detailed study 
commissioned by the National Council of Justice (“CNJ”) detected 
an imbalance between the fees in each of the 26 states of Brazil and 
the federal judiciary.41 The CNJ used this study to prepare 
legislative proposals.42 
Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of free access to justice 
for people without financial means is being reevaluated.43 Another 
study on the subject of gratuitous justice was commissioned by the 
Federal Courts’ National Intelligence Center and prepared by 
federal judges, Taís Schilling Ferraz and Vânila Cardoso Moraes.44 
 
 
have requests subjected to analysis by the court. The National Council of Justice 
understood that this procedure does not offend the guarantees of the parties. CNJ 
recognizes that there is no impropriety in TJMA Resolution 43/2017.). 
38 See Jeferson Melo, Projeto Piloto Marca Integraçao Entre Pje e 




40 See Manuel Carlos Montenegro, CNJ Submits to Congress a Bill to Regulate 
Court Costs, CNJ NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 14, 2020) https://www.cnj.jus.br/cnj- 
entrega-ao-congresso-proposta-de-lei-para-disciplinar-custas-judiciais/. 
41 See Departamento de Pesquisas Judiciarias, Diagnóstico Das Custas 
Processuais Practicadas Nos Tribunais (2019), 
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/relatorio_custas_processuais 
2019.pdf (Braz.). 
42 Montenegro, supra note 40. 
43 See Taís Schilling Ferraz & Vânila Cardoso Moraes, Nota Técnica N. 




44 NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE, https://www.cnj.jus.br/sobre-o-cnj/quem- 
somos/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2021) (The National Council of Justice (Centro 
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As an example of how the courts are shifting their view of gratuitous 
justice, the study suggests that any such provision must be premised 
on a study of its impact on the budget and in the litigiousness in each 
state and court.45 There is clear awareness now that judicial fees 
serve not only to balance the judicial budget but also to deter 
litigation. Another bill currently being debated in the Senate seeks 
to limit gratuitous judicial fees in Federal Small Claims Courts to 
people without financial means.46 In the same vein, the Federal 
Government is considering limiting gratuitous litigation against 
Social Security only to people without financial means.47 
The new Code of Civil Procedure aimed to address the issues of 
slow, excessive, and frivolous litigation, as well as to reduce the 
number of appeals. For example, amongst other devices, it provided 
for the reduction of judicial fees, an increase in attorney fees in case 
of an appeal, attorney fee-shifting, and fines in cases of non- 
compliance with performance (CPC/15, arts. 98-102 and 85).48 
The Employment Law Reform limited gratuitous justice to those 
who have an income below 40% of the highest income of the 
Brazilian equivalent of Social Security.49 The trend to limit 
gratuitous judicial fees to people without financial means is solid. 
The main concern is to find a balance between the fees charged 
and the amount spent by the states with the judicial system, 




Nacional de Justiça) is a branch of the Federal Court’s Council (Conselho da 
Justiça Federal)). 
45 Ferraz & Moraes, supra note 43. 
46 See Bruno Lourenço, CCJ Aprova Fim da Isenção Irrestrita de Custas 
Judiciais nos Juizados Especiais, RÁDIO SENDAO (May 17, 2019, 2:21 PM), 
https://www12.senado.leg.br/radio/1/noticia/ccj-aprova-fim-da-isencao- 
irrestrita-de-custas-judiciais-nos-juizados-especiais. 
47 See Thiago Resende, Worker May Have to Pay Costs of Proceedings Against 
the INSS, FOLHA DE S.PAULO, (Nov. 28, 2019, 2:00 AM), 
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2019/11/trabalhador-podera-ter-de- 
bancar-custos-de-processos-contra-o-inss.shtml. 
48 See Lei No. 13.105, de 16 de Março de 2015, art. 85 & 98-102, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.). 
49 The highest income for retirees in 2020 is about $2,000 USD a month. See Lei 
No 5.452, de 1 de Maio de 1943, Art. 790 §3, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 9.8.1943 (Braz.). 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 61 
 
 
those who need it.50 Since access to justice for people with financial 
needs is a constitutional guarantee, even if some of these changes 
are constitutionally dubious, there is no doubt about the direction of 
the winds. 
 
III THE MAIN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS THAT PROVIDE ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE IN BRAZIL (PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND PUBLIC 
DEFENDERS) AND THE COST OF LITIGATING IN BRAZIL 
Before we discuss the main issues, we need to address the issue 
of access to justice. Brazil has a broad array of procedural rules and 
proceedings designed for the protection of people who are 
procedurally vulnerable, such as groups of litigants with difficulty 
to organize themselves, employees, consumers, victims of 
environmental disasters, poor people, people with disabilities, 
minors, and the elderly (both in individual and class-action 
conflicts). After a long military dictatorship (between 1964 and 
1985), democracy was re-established in Brazil at a time when the 
worldwide movement for access to justice was at its strongest.51 As 
expected, the country was deeply influenced by the access to justice 
ideal of the mid-1970s to early 1980s.52 As a result of this worldwide 
 
50 See Revisão das Normas Relativas à Cobrança de Custas dos Servicaos 
Forenses da Concessão dos Beneficios da Justiça Gratuita, CONSELHO 
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (Nov. 28, 2019), https://www.cnj.jus.br/agendas/revisao- 
das-normas-relativas-a-cobranca-de-custas-dos-servicos-forenses-da-concessao- 
dos-beneficios-da-justica-gratuita/. 
51 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 247. 
52 Id.; see also CARLOS ALBERTO ALVARO DE OLIVEIRA, MAURO CAPPELLETTI E 
O DIREITO PROCESSUAL BRASILEIRO, 45 (Revista da Faculdade de Direito da 
UFRGS) (2001) (The Italian jurist Mauro Cappelletti was the person who most 
strongly influenced this worldwide tendency.); HERMES ZANETI JR., A 
CONSTITUCIONALIZAÇÃO DO PROCESSO: O MODELO CONSTITUCIONAL DA 
JUSTIÇA BRASILERIA E AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE PROCESSO E CONSTITUIÇÃO 154 
(2nd ed. 2014); see also DIERLE JOSÉ COELHO NUNES & LUDMILA FERREIRA 
TEIXEIRA, ACESSO À JUSTIÇA DEMOCRÁTICO, 44 (2013) (There is a strong 
correlation between the conclusions of the Florence Project and the Welfare 
State, and this correlation must be updated. Since the social model of State is 
replaced in all contemporary democracies by a deliberative-procedimental 
democracy model, we need to combine the social investments of the Social State 
with the personal responsibilities of the Liberal State, granting more liberty at 
lesser cost, with a change in the size of the State and investment in preferred 
areas and the creation of independent control agencies. This, however, does not 
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movement, the main concern of the Brazilian legislature during the 
process of re-democratization of the state was to ensure broad access 
to justice, which was effectuated through guarantees in the 1988 
Constitution.53 
The guarantee of access to justice was therefore written into the 
Constitution and the procedural rules, ensuring free legal protection. 
Article 5, LXXIV, of the Brazilian Constitution, states that “the 
State will provide integral and free legal assistance to those with 
insufficient means”.54 Some of the benefits for the poor include the 
waiving of court and expert fees and the waiving of fee-shifting.55 
These benefits are also available for class actions.56 Additionally, 
the Constitution created public institutions to guarantee access to 
justice.57 
The 1988 Constitution assigned to the Public Prosecutors 
(Ministerio Publico) the broad power to act for the protection of 
fundamental individual rights which are nonwaivable (droit 
indisponible) and rights of social interest of diffuse and collective 
character.58 Therefore, Brazilian Public Prosecutors must act not 
only in the criminal arena, or the traditional protection of the family 
and orphans, but also for the protection of a broad array of rights. 
They commonly bring lawsuits in the areas of health, education, the 
environment, and for the protection of the elderly, disabled, minors, 
consumers, and workers. 
To discharge their functions, the Public Prosecutors may bring 
individual lawsuits, class actions, and intervene in proceedings as 
 
affect the correctness of some of the premises of the Florence Project, which 
analyzed the problem of access to justice from a multidisciplinary approach 
(economic, sociologic, politic, etc.) and appointed as among the areas in need of 
reform: simplification, de-judicialization, and de-bureaucratization of the access 
to justice, from the perspective of the consumers of the justice system, not its 
operators. These premises are as valid today as they were in 1978.) 
53 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 247. 
54Id.; see also FREDIE DIDIER, JR. & RAFAEL ALEXANDRIA DE OLIVEIRA, 
BENEFÍCIO DA JUSTIÇA GRATUITA 11 (3rd. ed. 2008). 
55 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 247. 
56 See Lei No. 7.347, de 24 de Julho de 1985, Art. 18, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 25.7.1985 (Braz.). 
57 See infra p. 36, especially the comments on public prosecutors and public 
defenders’ role under the constitutional provisions. 
58 See Hermes Zaneti Júnior, O MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO E O NOVO PROCESSO CIVIL 
(2018). 
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custos legis.59 The role of the Public Prosecutors in the protection of 
group rights (diffuse and collective) against the State is possible 
only because of the constitutional guarantees of independence and 
specialization.60 
The Constitution also granted Public Defenders (Defensoria 
Publica) the role of representing the interest of people who are 
economically and legally in need.61 The representation is broad and 
can be judicial or extrajudicial, through individual lawsuits or class 
actions in the civil and criminal spheres.62 
Public Prosecutors and Public Defenders operate both in the 
federal system and in the systems of the several states.63 Therefore, 
there are Federal and State Public Prosecutors and Defenders. 
These institutions have been recently improved, with extensive 
public investments and changes to their structure to guarantee 
administrative and financial autonomy from the three branches of 
government, particularly the Executive. This was the result of strong 
lobbying, first on the part of the Public Prosecutors, then of the 
Public Defenders. The institutions that present the largest growth 
now are the Public Defenders.64 This growth is the result of political 





59 Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 379-82 (2003) 
(discussing this peculiar position of Public Prosecutors from Brazil in a 
comparative perspective); Antonio Herman Benjamin, Group Action and 
Consumer Protection in Brazil, in THIERRY BOURGOIGNIE (ED.), GROUP 
ACTIONS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 141, 153 (1992) (showing that, as 
contrasted to their European counterparts, Brazilian Public Prosecutors are 
active in the protection of group rights); Roger W. Findley, Pollution Control in 
Brazil, 15 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 1, 66 (1988) (discussing Public 
Prosecutors in Brazil). 
60 MAURO CAPPELLETTI, DIMENSIONI DELLA GIUSTIZIA NELLA SOCIETÀ 
CONTEMPORANEE 110 (1994); see also ANTONIO GIDI, RUMO A UM CÓDIGO DE 
PROCESSO CIVIL COLETIVO 400-18 (Editora Forense, 1st ed. 2008) (providing a 
critical view). 
61 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 134 (Braz.). 
62 Id. 
63 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 127-29, 134 (Braz.). 
64 See generally, Lígia Mori Madeira, Institutionalization, Reform and 
Independence of the Public Defender’s Office in Brazil, BRAZ. POL. SCI. REV. 48 
(2014). 
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levels of government through anti-corruption operations, such as 
Lava-Jato.65 
The evolution has been quick. The Office of the Public 
Prosecutors already has full administrative and financial autonomy 
from the branches of government.66 This autonomy is essential 
because the Constitution gives it the ability to police the other state 
agencies’ compliance with the Constitution, and with respect to 
fundamental rights (Articles. 127, 129, II e IX, CF/88).67 Moreover, 
each public prosecutor is independent from the Chief Public 
Prosecutor in the same way that judges are independent from the 
Chief Justice of a tribunal (Articles. 127(1), 129(4) e 93, CF/88).68 
With these constitutional changes, the Office of the Public 
Prosecutors no longer belongs to the Executive branch (as it did in 
the past), and instead exists as an autonomous institution, one that is 
indispensable to the administration of justice.69 
The development of the Office of the Public Defenders is more 
recent, although it was provided for in the 1988 Constitution (Article 
134, CF/88).70 Its administrative and functional autonomy is assured 
by the Constitution.71 Recent constitutional reform has conferred 
upon the Public Defenders' guarantees that are similar to those 
conferred upon the Judiciary and Prosecutors. Article 134 states, 
somewhat poetically, that 
 
“the Office of the Public Defenders is a permanent 
institution, essential to the jurisdictional function of 
the State, which has the objective, as an expression 
and instrument of the democratic regime, of giving 
legal orientation, promoting human rights and 
protection in all court instances, judicial and 
extrajudicial, of the individual and collective rights, 
 
65 Bryan Harris, Lead Prosecutor Quits Brazil’s ‘Lava Jato’ Probe, FIN. TIMES 
(Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/20dffdd9-05e6-442a-a1ac- 
c25335a863b6. 
66 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 127, §§ 2º-6º (Braz.). 
67 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 247. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 247-48. 
70 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 134 (Braz.). 
71 Id. 
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in a form comprehensive and gratuitous to people in 
need ....... ” 72 
 
Even though it is a necessary development for the full 
development of Brazilian society, the constitutional principle of 
broad access to justice, together with the maintenance of the public 
institutions that provide that access (Public Prosecutor and Public 
Defender), represents a major direct cost to the judicial system. But 
the costs also rise indirectly. The independence of the Public 
Prosecutor and the Public Defender means that they will bring 
lawsuits against the federal, state, and city governments. These 
lawsuits, some of them class actions, lead to major expenses with 
the construction of schools, hospitals, prisons, etc., and with damage 
claims against the State.73 
This litigation is a necessary development because of the 
constant failure of the government in effectuating the public policies 
adopted in the Constitution of 1988 and subsequent statutes, as well 
as the bad management of the Public Administration, which 
perpetuates a vicious circle caused by the State’s failure to 
administratively protect citizen’s rights when violated. There is a 
recent tendency to reduce this autophagic litigation, raising the self- 
control of the Public Administration by the recognition of 
administrative precedents (Article 496(4), IV, CPC/2015) and 
through alternative dispute resolution (Article 174, CPC/2015).74 
On the other hand, litigation in Brazil is still comparatively 
cheap. In many situations, the law provides for a waiver of court 
fees, which are usually necessary to finance the cost of the judicial 
 
72 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248. 
73 See Paulo CEZAR PINHEIRO CARNEIRO, ACESSO À JUSTIÇA 182 (2003) 
(discussing a study conducted in Rio de Janeiro according to which 90% of the 
class actions were brought by the State and one-third of all class actions were 
brought against the State); see also GEISA DE ASSIS RODRIGUES, AÇÃO CIVIL 
PÚBLICA E TERMO DE AJUSTAMENTO DE CONDUTA 271-73 (Editora Forense ed., 
2nd ed. 2006) (discussing a study according to which two thirds of all class 
actions settled extra procedurally by the Public Prosecutors (compromisso de 
ajustamento de conduta) were signed with the State or institutions connected to 
the State); see also ANTONIO GIDI, RUMO A UM CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL 
COLETIVO 404 (Editora Forense ed., 1st ed. 2008) (providing critical 
perspective). 
74 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248-49. 
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system.75 Even when there is payment of costs, the costs are low and 
independent from the value or complexity of the proceeding.76 The 
judiciary laws of each state set a maximum amount for these costs, 
which ultimately results in disproportionately low fees paid for 
expensive and complex cases involving a considerable amount of 
money.77 The Supreme Court decided that state laws that do not 
limit the amount of court fees are an unconstitutional violation of 
the principle of broad access to justice.78 However, attitudes are 
currently trending away from the principle of broad access to justice 
as a result of the economic crisis and the indebtedness of the states. 
Even the attorney fees of private lawyers are generally low 
because of the large number of lawyers and the availability of public 
defenders.79 
A few years ago we could say that Brazil was going in the 
opposite direction of international law reform and raising expenses 
with the judicial system.80 The current tendency, however, is to 
become more aware of the cost of the system of justice. The 
difference between the situation in 2014 and 2020 is striking. This 
contrast can be explained in several ways. 
First, Brazil experienced considerable economic growth in the 
past decades.81 By inserting itself in the international market, Brazil 
broadened access to products and services for a major part of the 
population that was below the line of poverty in the 1970s, who now 
account for a meaningful portion of a budding consumer market.82 
For example, Brazil has witnessed the steady increase of the so- 
called “Class C” (the group of people and families with a monthly 
income per capita of between $90 and $430), which today represents 
 
75 Id. This is the case of small claim courts, the legal aid for the poor and the 
class actions fee system. 




pFT (last visited Mar. 24, 2020). 
77 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248-49. 
78 See, e.g., S.T.F., ADI 4186/RO, Relator: Roberto Barroso, 10.12.2018 (Ro.). 
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54% of the Brazilian population and will spend 1.17 trillion Reals 
in 2014 (about half a trillion USD).83 
However, the current reality is different, and the numbers are 
different. A crisis haunts the country, and the Federal Government 
adopted a political orientation more in line with the market and the 
economy than with social rights. The data points to an increase in 
extreme poverty that afflicts 13.5 million people.84 
Second, Brazil has always been a country with sharp financial 
inequality (austerity-necessity).85 European countries prospered 
after World War II and could afford to provide their people with a 
series of social benefits but now need to curb them.86 Brazil, on the 
other hand, only just started distributing these benefits and may face 
a similar problem (austerity-control).87 Today, the need to control 
public finances is strong. The federal public debt has reached a 
record high of over 4 Trillion Reals (roughly equivalent to $1.2 
trillion USD).88 It would have been higher, but the federal 
government took austerity measures, including the control of public 
expenses and reduction of banking interest rates (responsible for the 
 
 
83See Mário Braga, 54% dos brasileiros formam a classe C, diz Serasa 
Experian, EXAME (Feb. 18, 2014, 2:09 PM) https://exame.com/economia/54- 
dos-brasileiros-formam-a-classe-c-diz-serasa-experian/ (stating that if the 
Brazilian Class C were a country, it would be the twelfth most populous with 
108 million people, and the eighteenth in consumption, representing 58% of the 
credit in the country). 
84 See Carla Jiménez, Extrema pobreza sobe e Brasil já soma 13,5 milhões de 
miseráveis, EL PAIS (Nov. 6, 2019, 11:35 AM), 
https://brasil.elpais.com/brasil/2019/11/06/politica/1573049315_913111.html. 
85 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248; see also LILIA M. SCHWARCZ AND 
HELOISA M. STARLING. BRASIL: UMA BIOGRAFIA 172 (2015) (English 
publication available at: LILIA M. SCHWARCZ AND HELOISA M. STARLING, 
BRAZIL: A BIOGRAPHY, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018)) 
(discussing how Brazil since D. João is in debt with foreign countries). 
86 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248; see also L. Buendía, P.J. Gómez 
Serrano & R. Molero-Simarro, Gone with the Crisis? Welfare State Change in 
Europe Before and Since the 2008 Crisis, 150 SOC. INDIC. RES. 243–264 (2020) 
(available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-020-02286-y) (It is a well-known 
and debated trend, not only provoked by 2008 crisis.). 
87 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248. 
88 Brazil National Government Debt, CEIC, 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/brazil/national-government-debt (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2020). 
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interest rates of its own debt).89 Several states, who are facing 
difficulties to pay public workers, have started dismantling the 
populations’ essential services.90 
Third, Brazilian politics, since the re-democratization in the 
1980s, has taken a consistent turn to the left, adopting several 
policies of social inclusion.91 Currently, the Federal Government is 
led by a group aligned with economic liberalism and conservative 
customs. President Jair Bolsonaro openly opposes the left-wing 
Worker’s Party, who governed the country in the previous years.92 
None of these former paths were wrong. On the contrary, social 
inclusion and effectiveness of rights are investments, not costs.93 
But Brazilians must acknowledge that these goals must not be 
pursued only in the Judiciary. Otherwise, the cost of the Judiciary 
Branch may lead to less effectiveness in the protection of these 
rights. The Brazilian Judiciary has acted as the driving force behind 
social equality and must continue to play this role. But we must 
consider alternatives to the judicial solution, and even alternatives 
 
 
89 See e.g., Idiana Tomazelli & Lorenna Rodrigues, 'Nós vamos derrubar a 
dívida pública', diz Guedes, UOL (Nov. 6, 2020), 
https://economia.uol.com.br/noticias/estadao-conteudo/2020/11/06/nos-vamos- 
derrubar-a-divida-publica-diz-guedes.htm?cmpid=copiaecola (specifically the 
recent comments of Paulo Guedes, Economy Minister, to control the public debt 
in times of COVID-19). 
90 See, e.g., Fernando Ferreira Filho and Volnei Piccolotto, A Dívida Pública do 
Rio Grande do Sul: uma análise sob a Ótica da Hipótese de Fragilidade 
Financeira de Minks, ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA, PORTO ALEGRE, V. 36, N. 71, P. 295- 
322, SET. 2018 (arguing that the policy of privatizations and concessions of 
public services, however, did not result in reduction of public debt in the State of 
Rio Grande do Sul). 
91 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 248. 
92 See John Cherian, Brazil on the Rampage, FRONTLINE (Feb. 1, 2019), 
https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/article26004053.ece. 
93 See LUIGI FERRAJOLI, LA DEMOCRAZIA ATTRAVERSO I DIRITTI. IL 
COSTITUZIONALISMO GARANTISTA COME MODELLO TEORICO E COME PROGETTO 
POLITICO 154-155 (2013) (arguing that the economic crisis and the weakening 
of fundamental rights in Europe led to an increase of social inequality. In 
opposition to the neoliberal thought, the author defends that it was the European 
investment in social rights that allowed its growth after the World War II.); see 
also LUIGI FERRAJOLI, A DEMOCRACIA ATRAVÉS DOS DIREITOS. O 
CONSTITUCIONALISMO GARANTISTA COMO MODELO TEÓRICO E COMO PROJETO 
POLÍTICO (2015). 
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to public solutions, to ensure the effectiveness of the fundamental 
rights while reducing costs and increasing efficiency. 
In this new situation, the importance of the Judiciary is to 
guarantee fundamental rights without unnecessarily increasing 
costs. The Judiciary must be able to manage its budget, protect 
fundamental rights, and assure access to justice for all (not only 
those with access to the Judiciary), without overburdening the 
Executive branch and the market, while at the same time forging a 
sustainable economic environment. 
 
IV NO TRADITION OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN BRAZIL AND 
NEW TRENDS: THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE (CNJ) AND THE 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE JUDICIARY (ADJ) 
When we first addressed this issue in 2014, we mentioned a 
recent surge of statistical studies concerning the efficiency of the 




94 Many Brazilian scholars, such as Barbosa Moreira, have complained for 
decades about the lack of judicial statistics. See Jose Carlos Barbosa Moreira, A 
Emenda Constitucional nº 45 e o Processo, in JOSE CARLOS BARBOSA 
MOREIRA, 9 TEMAS DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL 21-36, esp. 31 ff (2007). 
95 Law 11.364.2006 created the Department of Judicial Research (“DPJ”), which 
produces the annual report Justice in Numbers, and discusses the performance of 
the courts. Lei No. 11.364, de 26 de Outubro de 2006, DIÀRIO OFICIAL DO 
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 27.10.2006 (Braz.). The most recent report was published in 
2020, where the Judiciary made the data available in a searchable form that 
shows a picture of the expenses with the Judiciary and the lawsuits divided into 




(last visited Aug. 30, 2020). The National Council of Public Prosecutors 
(“CNMP”) now publishes a report called “Public Prosecutors: A Picture” 
(Ministério Público: Um Retrato), with data collected from all Office of Public 
Prosecutors in all states and federal. See Conselho Nacional do Ministério 
Público, Ministério Público um Retrato 2018 (Assessoria de Comunicação do 
CNMP, 2018), 
https://www.cnmp.mp.br/portal/images/Publicacoes/documentos/2019/Anu%C3 
%A1rio_um_retrato_2018_ERRATA_1.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2020). The 
current situation is much more advanced than in 2014, but it is still possible to 
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Being a diverse country with disparate regional realities, 
continental dimensions (Brazil is larger than the continental U.S. 
and Europe), and a population of more than 210 million,96 judicial 
statistics are still difficult to gather, and the numbers are difficult to 
interpret. 
The 2004 Constitutional reform of the Judiciary (EC 45/2004) 
created public entities to exercise external control of the Judiciary 
and the Public Prosecutors (Ministério Público).97 Article 103-B of 
the Constitution established the National Council of Justice 
(Conselho Nacional de Justiça, CNJ), and Article 130-A established 
the National Council of Public Prosecutors (Conselho Nacional do 
Ministério Público, CNMP).98 The objective was to harmonize and 
standardize the services that provide access to justice and provide 
effective control of these services. The Constitutional Reform also 
created a special department under the Ministry of Justice: the 
Secretary of the Reform of the Judiciary (Secretaria de Reforma do 
Poder Judiciário). The Secretary of the Reform of the Judiciary was 
a permanent entity responsible for centralizing and proposing 
governmental initiatives to improve procedural rules and access to 
justice. Because of budget limitations, the government extinguished 
the Secretary of the Reform of the Judiciary in 2016 transferring its 
role to the National Secretary of Justice (Secretaria Nacional de 
Justiça).99 The creation of these organizations has led to positive 
results – all of them produce statistics that measure the efficiency of 
the Brazilian system of justice and offer concrete data to support law 
reform. 
In 2013, The Ministry of Justice published an Atlas of the 
Judiciary, showing the proportion of judges, public prosecutors, 
 
criticize the initiative regarding the completeness of the data and inconsistencies 
in how it is fed. 
96 Population, Total – Brazil, WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=BR%20.-BR (last 
visited Sep. 19, 2020). 
97 See Emenda Constitucional No 45, de 30 de Dezembro de 2004, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 31.12.2004 (Braz.). 
98 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103-A, 103-B (Braz.). 
99 See Sérgio Renault, Pierpaolo Cruz Bottini & Maria Tereza Sadek, Fim da 
Secretaria de Reforma do Judiciário é uma perda importante, CONSULTOR 
JURÍDICO (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.conjur.com.br/2016-mar-30/fim- 
secretaria-reforma-judiciario-perda-importante. 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW 71 
 
 
lawyers, and public defenders in the country.100 According to the 
data for 2013, Brazil has approximately 625,000 lawyers, 17,100 
judges, 14,070 public prosecutors, and 6,030 public defenders for 
201 million inhabitants.101 
But even good initiatives have negative consequences. As a 
contradictory and vicious circle, constitutionally guaranteed broad 
access to justice leads to a proliferation of lawsuits, which in turn 
burdens the judiciary and limits the reach of the constitutionally 
guaranteed ideal. CNJ research has demonstrated what we already 
knew: the major litigants in Brazilian civil justice are from the public 
sector in all its areas (cities, states, and the federal government), and 
from financial institutions (banks, insurance, and credit card 
companies).102 
It is ironic to see the State as the main culprit for overburdening 
the judiciary. The State, to avoid spending money, refuses to comply 
with its obligations and behaves illegally against its citizens, forcing 
them to turn to the Judiciary for help. This behavior is self- 
destructive because it not only increases the expenses of the judicial 
system, but also overburdens it with unnecessary work that brings 
the economy to a halt, makes the country less competitive, generates 
less wealth, and consequently raises fewer taxes. 
The overburdening of Brazilian courts created by the broad 
access to justice guaranteed in the Constitution has led to the current 
tendency of the Brazilian civil procedure system to create “model 
proceedings,” “pilot cases,” or “test cases” for the aggregation and 
resolution of repetitive claims.103 A CNJ study shows the impact that 
 
 
100 See Danyelle Simōes, Atlas é o Maior Banco de Dados Sobre a Justiça No 




102 See 100 Maiores Litigantes, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (2012), 
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/100_maiores_litigantes.pdf. 
103Antonio do Passo Cabral, A Escolha da Causa-Piloto nos Incidentes de 
Resolução de Processos Repetitivos 231 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 201 (2014); 
Antonio do Passo Cabral, O Novo Procedimento-Modelo (MusterVerfahren) 
Alemão: Uma Alternativa às Ações Coletivas, 147 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 123 
(2007) (The new CPC/2015 provided for two types of repetitive cases (Art. 
928): (a) an incident for the resolution of repetitive cases (IRDR) and (b) the 
repetitive special and extraordinary appeals (REER)). 
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repetitive claims have on the slowing of the Brazilian civil justice 
system and highlights the need to adopt standardized proceedings to 
resolve repetitive conflicts.104 
Another CNJ initiative to promote efficiency in the Judiciary 
was the general report comparing data on the experience of selected 
countries with the evaluation of the performance of the Judiciary.105 
The study shows that the new trend is to evaluate the performance 
of the Judiciary. This kind of study was absorbed by a broader study 
called “Justice in Numbers” (Justiça em Números)106 and the 
Performance Evaluation of the Judiciary.107 
The 2011 Performance Evaluations pointed to negative and 
positive aspects of the performance evaluation.108 For example, one 
negative aspect that led to resistance from legal professionals 
against the evaluation was that the criteria did not take into account 
that different proceedings have different levels of complexity.109 
Furthermore, it is not possible to adopt uniform criteria without 
taking into consideration the differences between complex 
proceedings, (like class actions and bankruptcy) and simpler 
proceedings (like family conflicts and collection claims). This kind 
of problem persists given the difficulty to adjust the complexity of 
each case to the performance of each judge. 
Another negative concern is that the evaluation could lead to a 
weakening of judicial independency: judges would seek to increase 
productivity by automatizing decisions. This concern is still valid 
 
104 See Demandas Repetitivas e a Morosidade na Justiça cível Brasileira, 
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (Julio 2011), https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp- 
content/uploads/2011/02/pesq_sintese_morosidade_dpj.pdf; see also Relatório 
do Banco Nacional de Dados de Demandas Repetitivas e Precedentes 
Obrigatórios, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTICA (2018), 
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp- 
content/uploads/2011/02/03a6c043d7b9946768ac79a7a94309af.pdf. 
105 See AVALIAÇÃO DO DESEMPENHO JUDICIAL: DESAFIOS, EXPERIÊNCIAS, 
INTERNACIONAIS E PERSPECTIVAS, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (2011), 
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/40-211-1-PB.pdf. 
106 See generally Justiça Em Números 2019 Súmario Executivo, CONSELHO 
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp- 
content/uploads/conteudo/arquivo/2019/08/8ee6903750bb4361b5d0d1932ec663 
2e.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2020). 
107 Id. 
108 See AVALIAÇÃO DO DESEMPENHO JUDICIAL, supra note 105. 
109 Id. 
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but has significantly reduced in past years. Younger judges are 
better adapted to the tools of electronic proceedings and tend to be 
more attentive to the effective management of their caseload. 
On the other hand, the evaluation may bring advantages: 
implementing qualitative and quantitative controls, as well as 
incentives, to judicial productivity may improve the results of 
judicial activity by providing transparency, speed, efficiency, legal 
certainty, and a reduction in the amount of litigation. This method 
would simultaneously accomplish both important elements of legal 
reform in Brazil: efficiency and legal certainty. 
The implementation of the taxonomy and the controls by means 
of electronic reports periodically sent to the court and then to the 
CNJ to feed Justice in Numbers led to a major transformation. Now, 
a judge may obtain information in real-time about the volume and 
type of cases in his or her court, as well as the status of each 
proceeding just by accessing the court’s website.110 These electronic 
reports also allow tribunals to oversee the online work of judges.111 
This implementation also sheds light on basic questions like the 
duration and cost of proceedings in Brazil. According to the report 
Justice in Numbers, the average time between the filing of the 
complaint and the judgment has increased between 2015 and 
2018.112 
According to same report, the average duration of a proceeding 
from the filing of a complaint to the res judicata, after all appeals, 
is 3 years and 8 months.113 This duration is a frustratingly long time 
to wait to have one’s right formally recognized in court. But this 
information is meaningless. In the Brazilian system, a plaintiff may 
have his or her right recognized in court, but not have his or her right 
realized in practice. In most cases, including when the defendant is 
the government, after res judicata, plaintiffs still need to begin a 
proceeding to judicially enforce the judgment before the defendants 
 
 
110 See Brazil: Federal Supreme Court Launches Central Database, LIBR. OF 
CONG. (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/brazil- 
federal-supreme-court-launches-central-database/. 
111 See Monthly Productivity Module, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, 
https://www.cnj.jus.br/pesquisas-judiciarias/modulo-de-produtividade-mensal/ 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2021). 
112 See Justiça Em Números 2019, supra note 106, at 8. 
113 See Justiça em Números 2019, supra note 106. 
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comply.114 The average duration of the enforcement proceeding 
from the time of res judicata until its closure, is 8 years and 1 month 
in the Federal Justice and 6 years and 2 months in the State 
Justice.115 This time is in addition to the 3 years and 8 months 
mentioned above. Moreover, in addition to a long and frustrating 
wait, a final resolution may never come to fruition. These statistics 
do not show the number of enforcement proceedings that were 
closed unsuccessfully; many enforcement proceedings were 
abandoned because the court was not able to locate any property 
belonging to the defendant.116 
As if these numbers were not sufficiently depressing, they fail to 
reflect reality because these averages also include small claims 
courts, which are speedier and less generous with appeals.117 In the 
regular justice system, the rule is that almost all judgments are 
appealed and need to be enforced judicially.118 There is yet another 
distortion: the averages also include lawsuits that were dismissed 
early in the proceeding,119 further pushing the numbers artificially 
down. Therefore, the real average duration of a proceeding for the 
regular justice system is much higher than reported. 
Those are the reasons why the current 2020 Justice in Numbers 
report (referring to 2019) separated the numbers from the regular 
justice system and the small claims courts. 
Below is the average duration of each proceeding in the regular 
justice system, excluding those dismissed early in the proceeding: 
First instance: 3 years and 11 months 
Second instance: 2 years and 1 month 
Enforcement: 7 years 
Average duration of proceedings in small claims courts: 
First instance: 1 year and 8 months 
Second instance: 2 years and 3 months 
Enforcement: 1 year and 9 months 
This new way of reporting the data confirms what everyone 
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faster than in the regular justice system, and (2) that excluding cases 
of early dismissal would give a more accurate average of duration 
of proceedings.120 
As has been the premise of this article all along, there is a cost 
in maintaining these judicial proceedings for so long. There is an 
obvious cost for the interested parties, but there is also a cost for the 
economy of the country in the face of an ineffective legal system. 
And there is a cost in the administration of justice because courts are 
backlogged, heavy and slow, and demand more materials and more 
personnel. Thus, we all lose. 
Today, we know how much the justice system in Brazil costs. 
According to Justice in Numbers, the total expenses with the 
Judiciary correspond to 1.4% of GDP or 2.6% of the total expenses 
of the Union, the state, and the municipalities.121 In 2018, the cost 
for the justice system was 449.53 Reals.122 This cost is not a huge 
amount taken out of context: it is a mere $150 USD. But, it becomes 
a significant amount considering that it is about half the monthly 
minimum wage.123 
Unfortunately, the report does not offer precise information 
about the average cost of legal proceedings. But one may use the 
overall expenses of the Federal Courts to arrive at an estimated cost 
of about 7.252 Reals (about $2,500 USD) per proceeding.124 
Another official study identified the average duration of tax 
enforcement proceedings in federal courts.125 According to the 
 
 
120 See generally Justiça Em Números 2020 Súmario Executivo, CONSELHO 
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp- 
content/uploads/2020/08/WEB_V2_SUMARIO_EXECUTIVO_CNJ_JN2020.p 
df (last visited Oct. 1, 2020); see also Erik Navarro, ANÁLISE ECONÔMICA DO 
PROCESSO CIVIL: COMO A ECONOMIA, O DIREITO E A PSICOLOGIA PODEM 
VENCER A “TRAGÉDIA DA JUSTIÇA” 56-61 (2020). 
121 See Justiça Em Números 2020, supra note 120. 
122 Id. 
123 See Justiça Em Números 2019, supra note 106. 
124 See Hermes Zaneti Jr. and Gustavo Mattedi Reggiani, Estabilização da 
Tutela Antecipada Antecedente e Incidental: Sugestões Pragmáticas para 
Respeitar a Ideologia de Efetividade do CPC/2015, 284 R.T. 213 (2018) 
(considering twelve years and nine months as the average duration of a 
proceeding in Federal Courts, from filing to enforcement). 
125See A EXECUÇAO FISCAL NO BRASIL E O IMPACTO NO JUDICIÁRIO, CONSELHO 
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (2011), https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp- 
76 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:49 
 
 
study, the average duration of judicial tax enforcement proceedings 
is 8 years, 2 months, and 9 days per proceeding, and the average cost 
is about 4,685.39 Reals per proceeding approximately $1,976 
USD).126 Since the average collection claim is 22,507.51 Reals 
(about $9,537 USD), the average cost of tax enforcement 
proceedings in Brazil represents almost a quarter of the average 
value of the lawsuit.127 Considering that cost is merely the expense 
incurred by the Judiciary, (it does not include the cost incurred by 
the Administration) and the value refers to the total value of the 
claim (not the amount actually collected), this data reveals that the 
judicial service in tax enforcement proceedings is very expensive. 
Therefore, this data demonstrates that it is necessary to correct 
something in the investment in access to justice, where we could 
spend less while still creating a more efficient justice system. This 
study led to legislative bills seeking to dejudicialize the enforcement 
of tax and other governmental credits (known as fiscal enforcement 
or execução fiscal).128 
The problem of fiscal enforcement is particularly important 
because these proceedings represent more than one-third of all 
proceedings pending in Brazil. A legislative bill allowed arbitration 




fiscal enforcement, especially the research done by UFRGS and IPEA). 
126 See CUSTO UNITÁRIO DO PROCESSO DE EXECUÇÃO FISCAL NA JUSTIÇA 




127 Id.; see also A EXECUÇAO FISCAL NO BRASIL E O IMPACTO NO JUDICIÁRIO, 
supra note 128. 
128 See Senador Antonio Anastasia (PSDB/MG), Projeto de Lei No. 4257, de 
2019, SENADO FEDERAL, https://legis.senado.leg.br/sdleg- 
getter/documento?dm=7984784&ts=1594035701857&disposition=inline. 
129 Projeto de Lei 6.204/2019, available at 
https://www25.senado.leg.br/web/atividade/materias/-/materia/139971 V. Joel 
Dias Figueiredo Júnior, O alvissareiro Projeto de Lei 6.204/19: desjudicialização 
de títulos executivos civis e a crise da jurisdição estatal, GenJurídico, December 
06, 2019, available at http://genjuridico.com.br/2019/12/06/projeto-de-lei-6204- 
desjudicializacao/. 
Luciano Athayde Chaves, A desjudicialização da execução: o Projeto de Lei nº 
6.204/2019, Conjur, March 25, 2021, available at 
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Congress cited information from the 2017 edition of Justice in 
Numbers, which pointed to a 91% backlog in fiscal enforcement.130 
This percentage means that out of each 100 proceedings of fiscal 
enforcement in a year, only 9 are concluded. This percentage is the 
highest backlog of any kind of proceeding in the Brazilian judicial 
system.131 
Overall, these studies are part of the movement started by the 
three branches of government in the search of a more efficient and 
secure Judiciary, but the results are not yet conclusive. 
 
V EFFICIENCY AND LEGAL CERTAINTY VERSUS COST: MAIN 
ASPECTS OF THE SOLUTION OF THE “CRISIS” OF THE JUDICIARY AND 
AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL INITIATIVE 
In the 2014 version of this article, the main concern in Brazil 
regarding the Judiciary was efficiency and legal certainty.132 In the 
few years after that, the Brazilian Judiciary went through a 
transformation derived from the change in the economic situation of 
the country. The result is a new concern for austerity in public 
expenses related to the Brazilian Justice System.133 It is now 
concerned with data about the total cost and with Fiscal 
Responsibility Law. All of this is in addition to the predominant 
concern in 2014 of efficiency and legal certainty, considering that 
these objectives are not contradictory, but complementary. 
Several recent law reform initiatives, especially the new Code of 
Civil Procedure (CPC/15), reveal a concern to provide techniques to 
address simple matters, small claims, and special proceedings for 
collecting debts based on documentary evidence.134 For example, 
Congress improved the microsystem of small claims courts (called 




130 See Justiça em Números 2017, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA 
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp- 
content/uploads/2019/08/b60a659e5d5cb79337945c1dd137496c.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 26, 2021). 
131 Id. at 113. 
132 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 245. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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“monitory action,” the binding precedents, and proceedings for the 
aggregation and resolution of repetitive conflicts related only to 
issues of law.135 Congress also  increased the  number  of 
‘extrajudicial  executive titles’ or   ‘extrajudicial enforcement 
instruments’ (títulos executivos extrajudiciais),  which are 
documents, like checks, bills of exchange, some public documents, 
and even some contracts, that are considered so certain that the 
creditor may file enforcement proceedings directly, even in the 
absence of a judgment (which is called “judicial executive title”).136 
These procedural techniques increase the efficiency and legal 
certainty of the Brazilian legal system because they promote a 
speedy delivery of justice, make rights effective, reduce litigation, 
and avoid contradictory judgments. Additionally, there is a 
substantial ideological movement to reduce litigious culture through 
mediation, conciliation, and reduced involvement of courts in 
certain matters like family law and wills.137 
Reduction of costs associated with the judicial activity is now 
one of the main concerns in Brazil and is discussed in courts and the 
CNJ.138 Both the courts and the CNJ have included in their agenda 
considerations of cost and proportionality of the investment, without 
disregarding the classic debate on procedural efficiency, legal 
certainty, and access to justice.. 
As mentioned above, the need for the improvement of the 
Brazilian Judiciary led to the creation of a special department under 
the Ministry of Justice (Secretaria de Reforma do Poder Judiciario) 
to be a permanent department responsible for centralizing and 
proposing governmental initiatives to improve procedural rules and 
access to justice. In 2004, the three branches of the Brazilian Federal 
Government (the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary) got together 
to sign a political agreement. This agreement was known as Pacto 






137 See C.P.C. 2015 art. 3 (recognizing as a fundamental norm, the 
encouragement of alternative dispute resolution, such as arbitration and 
consensual resolution (mediation, conciliation, etc.); see also CONSELHO 
NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, Res. 118.2014. 
138 See generally, Justiça em números 2020, supra note 120. 
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speedy and efficient Judiciary.139 These efforts led to several law 
reform initiatives. For example, the Code of Civil Procedure was 
amended and the jurisdiction of small-claims courts was expanded. 
These efforts led even to a major Constitutional Amendment (EC 
45/2004).140 
The Republican Pact had a powerful impact in Brazil. Despite 
being a federal system, only the Federal Government may enact 
legislation about procedural matters.141 This means that state courts 
throughout Brazil apply the federally-enacted Code of Civil 
Procedure in its state proceedings.   Therefore, these initiatives had 
a direct impact in every court in the country. These initiatives had 
other objectives in addition to increase efficiency of the 
jurisdictional services through prevention of conflicts and the 
reasonable duration of process. They also intended to protect the 
universal access to justice (especially of the poor), and to strengthen 
the Rule of Law and the protection of human rights.142 Nowadays, 
these measures are combined with a growing concern for austerity 
and the cost for the system of justice, which is now intensely 
discussed by the political community in Brazil, a sign of the 
economic and fiscal crisis that affects the country.143 
Furthermore, these concerns with efficiency and legal certainty 
may be exaggerated. Several criticisms have been raised relating to 
these law reforms because their excessive concern with efficiency 
may deny certain procedural guarantees. But so far, the Brazilian 
Constitutional Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) has maintained 
the constitutionality of all procedural rules that have been 
challenged.144 These criticisms may be extended to Article 8 of the 
CPC/2015, which also refers to “efficiency.”145 These criticisms are 
 
 
139 See II Pacto Republicano de Estado por um Sistema de Justiça Mais 
Acessível Ágil e Efetivo, PRESIDÊNCIA DA REPÚBLICA, 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Outros/IIpacto.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2020). 
140 Id. 
141 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 22, I. 
142 See II Pacto Republicano de Estado, supre note XXXXX. 
143 See generally, id. 
144 See, e.g., ADI 5534, Rel. Dias Toffoli, j. 12.18.2020. 
145 C.P.C. 2015, art. 8. (“When applying the legal order, the judge will take into 
consideration the social objectives and the demands of the common welfare, 
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correct because the protection of rights must be “effective” (which 
is a legal concept), not “efficient” (which is an economic concept). 
Therefore, the reduction of the costs of the Judiciary must be made 
to guarantee a better result in the investments in the direct protection 
of the rights, not in the reduction of this protection.146 
Five years after the first Republican Pact was signed, the three 
branches of government signed the Second Republican Pact.147 To 
promote access to justice, it provided for the strengthening of the 
Public Defenders and the devices that guarantee comprehensive 
legal aid for the poor; a review of the class action statute to improve 
the protection of the diffuse, collective, and homogeneous 
individual rights and to obtain a more efficient judgment of mass 
conflicts; and the creation of small-claims courts for use by 
individuals and small companies (not large companies) against the 
state and municipality.148 These priorities reveal the current 
relevance of the Public Defenders, class actions, and the small- 
claims courts. 
There was no consensus in the Legislative Branch regarding 
class action law reform; despite the production and broad discussion 
regarding a bill proposing a new class action law, it was not 
approved.149 But, the Second Republican Pact led to the enactment 
of several statutes and yet another Constitutional Amendment 
strengthening the Public Defenders and creating the small-claims 
court for claims against states and municipalities.150 The creation in 
2009 of courts for small claims against states and municipalities was 
the direct result of the above-mentioned CNJ study that 
 
 
protecting and promoting the dignity of the human being and observing 
proportionality, reasonability, legality, publicity, and efficiency.”). 
146 See Xandra Kramer & Shusuke Kakiuchi, Austerity in Civil Procedure and 
the Role of Simplified Procedures, 8 ERASMUS L. REV. 139, 145-46 (2015). 
147 See II Pacto Republicano de Estado, supra note 142; see also Brazil: Reform 
of the Judiciary, LIBR. OF CONG. (Apr. 24, 2009), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/brazil-reform-of-the-judiciary/. 
148 Id. 
149 See ANTONIO GIDI, RUMO A UM CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL COLETIVO: A 
CODIFICAÇÃO DAS AÇÕES COLETIVAS NO BRASIL (2008) (discussing and 
criticizing the main projects for Class Action Codes in Brazil); see also FREDIE 
DIDIER, JR. & HERMES ZANETI, JR., CURSO DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL CIVIL: 
PROCESSO COLETIVO 4 (2014). 
150 See II Pacto Republicano de Estado, supra note 139. 
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demonstrated that the public sector is one of the main litigators in 
civil courts.151 
After that, came more law reform. The Code of Civil Procedure 
of 2015 provided that the Union, the states, and the municipalities 
will create institutions to promote mediation and conciliation 
(Article 174).152 
Until recently, the debate in Brazil revolved around the 
broadening of these simplified procedures and mass forms of legal 
proceedings. The main scholarly concern was whether the excessive 
simplification and massification may reduce the quality of 
substantial justice, and whether it was a violation of the procedural 
guarantees provided in the Brazilian Constitution.153 This issue was 
the debate of the time, not austerity. 
On the other hand, even with the recent creation of all these new 
benefits, there is no corresponding increase in the value of court fees 
and sometimes they are even waived by law for people without the 
means to pay them.154 Moreover, the overall cost of litigation is 
low.155 The tendency is to address this issue. With the crisis, one of 
the main concerns is to make the Judiciary sustainable, if not self- 
sufficient, through judicial fees. There is a growing awareness that 
extremely low judicial fees are an incentive for frivolous 
litigation.156 We stated this concern in 2014: “This is a further 
incentive to the proposal of meritless claims (by plaintiffs) and the 
meritless resistance to the fulfillment of legitimate claims (by 




152 C.P.C. 2015, art. 174. 
153 See, e.g. Fernando Gama de Miranda Netto, Garantias do Processo Justo nos 
Juizados Especiais Cíveis, in FERNANDO GAMA DE MIRANDA NETTO AND 
FELIPE BORRING ROCHA (ORGS.), JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS 49-69 (2010). 
154 C.P.C. 2015, art. 98. 
155 See CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, DIAGNÓSTICO DAS CUSTAS 
PROCESSUAIS PRATICADAS NOS TRIBUNAIS 35 (2019) (research concluding that 
the Judiciary collects 62.6% of its expenses), https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp- 
content/uploads/2019/11/relatorio_custas_processuais2019.pdf. 
156 Fernanda Elisabeth Nöthen Becker & Alexandre Morais da Rosa, As Custas 
Judiciais como Mecanismo de Desincentivo à Litigância Abusiva, ENAJUS 
ENCONTRO DE ADMINISTRAÇÃO DA JUSTIÇA, 
https://www.enajus.org.br/2018/assets/sessoes/056_EnAjus.pdf (last visited Jan. 
23, 2021). 
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increases the expenses, generating a vicious circle that is difficult to 
stop.”157 
Until recently, the need for austerity was not a part of the public 
and political debate in Brazil. Even though the concept of austerity 
is not limited to the global financial crisis that started in 2007, and 
includes the need to reign in the judicial costs or the effects on 
society in general and the parties in particular (companies, 
consumers, and individuals), it had been completely ignored. These 
effects are negative externalities and must be addressed because, in 
the long run, they reduce the potential for economic development 
and the distribution of wealth, further reducing the effectiveness of 
the fundamental rights that the State must provide. 
Below, we address the historical and sociological construction 
of the Brazilian Justice system and its peculiarities, especially the 
relationship between a constitutional order (strongly influenced by 
the U.S. common law) and an infra-constitutional structure (with a 
strong influence of the Continental European tradition). 
Understanding these peculiarities is essential to forge the path for a 
justice system that is speedy, cheap, efficient, and predictable, 
without violating the substantial and procedural guarantees provided 
for by the Constitution. 
 
VI THE PECULIARITIES OF THE BRAZILIAN JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE VERSUS EUROPEAN 
INFRA-CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 
Brazilian civil procedure (infra-constitutional rules) belongs 
to the civil law tradition of Continental Europe, strongly influenced 
by Portuguese,158 Italian,159 and German procedural traditions. 
However, the Brazilian constitutional matrix was profoundly 
influenced by the U.S. Constitution, including its judicial 
 
 
157 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 251. 
158 See HERMES ZANETI JR., IL VALORE VINCOLANTE DEI PRECEDENTI (2014); 
UGO MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMP. L. 
523-53 (2009) (offering a comparative view of the administrative and 
constitutional justice system in the civil law tradition). 
159 The comparison with Italian civil procedure is one of the most common. See, 
e.g., MICHELE TARUFFO & DANIEL MITIDIERO, A JUSTIÇA CIVIL: DA ITÁLIA AO 
BRASIL, DOS SETECENTOS A HOJE (2018). 
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organization. The combination of influences is why Brazil does not 
have an administrative justice system (the conflicts between private 
parties and the State are decided by the Judiciary), and why there is 
a broad possibility of judicial review (with judicial control of 
administrative acts and a diffuse and concentrated review of 
constitutionality of legislative acts by the Judiciary).160 
This peculiarity generates a “methodological paradox.”161 Brazil 
has an encompassing system of civil justice, in which the same judge 
that decides conflicts between private parties also decides conflicts 
between private parties and the state.162 Both are considered civil 
claims and civil proceedings in a broad sense, and the civil 
procedure adopted is the same.163 However, the first is regulated by 
 
160 HERMES ZANETI JR. A CONSTITUCIONALIZAÇÃO DO PROCESSO. O 
MODELO CONSTITUCIONAL DA JUSTIÇA BRASILEIRA E AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE 
PROCESSO E CONSTITUIÇÃO 5 (2014); see also VINCENZO VARRANO AND 
VITTORIA BARSOTTI, 1 LA TRADIZIONE GIURIDICA OCCIDENTALI 508 (2010); 
MARIO G. LOSANO, OS GRANDES SISTEMAS JURÍDICOS. INTRODUÇÃO AOS 
SISTEMAS JURÍDICOS EUROPEUS E EXTRA-EUROPEUS 215 (2007) (American 
comparative law scholars have also stressed the point as a significant gap 
between Latin American models of power control and European models); see 
also David S. Clark, Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America, 
2 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL L.Q. 405-442 (1975). 
161 See CANDIDO RANGEL DINAMARCO, 1 INSTITUIÇÕES DE DIREITO 
PROCESSUAL CIVIL 176 (2003) (“[F]rom a global perspective, the Brazilian 
procedural culture offers a major methodological problem because it accepts 
concepts and proposals from European masters, especially Germans and Italians, 
and at the same time, its political and constitutional formula of separation of 
state powers resembles the North American model.”). 
162 HERMES ZANETI JR. A CONSTITUCIONALIZAÇÃO DO PROCESSO. O 
MODELO CONSTITUCIONAL DA JUSTIÇA BRASILEIRA E AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE 
PROCESSO E CONSTITUIÇÃO 5 (2014); see also VINCENZO VARRANO AND 
VITTORIA BARSOTTI, 1 LA TRADIZIONE GIURIDICA OCCIDENTALI 508 (2010); 
MARIO G. LOSANO, OS GRANDES SISTEMAS JURÍDICOS. INTRODUÇÃO AOS 
SISTEMAS JURÍDICOS EUROPEUS E EXTRA-EUROPEUS 215 (2007) (American 
comparative law scholars have also stressed the point as a significant gap 
between Latin American models of power control and European models); see 
also David S. Clark, Judicial Protection of the Constitution in Latin America, 
2 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL L.Q. 405-442 (1975). 
163 The Supreme Court has already ruled several times on the existence of the 
system in Brazil and its constitutional character, resulting from the 1988 Federal 
Constitution. To illustrate: “As is known [in Brazil], the checks and balances 
system is adopted, whereby the Powers of the the State interacts, even though it 
uses functions that are not typical of them, in order to allow a mutual inspection 
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private law, while the second is regulated by public law.164 The 
peculiarities of the public law litigation are ignored, and both types 
of litigation are regulated by liberal procedural guarantees that are– 
–by design––predominantly concerned with private litigation. 
Because of these characteristics, Brazilian judges have a central 
role in conducting proceedings (although the procedural law is 
detailed) with broad investigative powers, including their ability to 
order the production of evidence sua sponte (Art. 370, 
CPC/2015).165 The parties retain the initiative to request a response 
from the Judiciary (principio da demanda, Article 2, CPC/2015), 
but the proceedings progress by official decree (sua sponte), with a 
strong trend to a public view of procedure.166 
The Brazilian Justice system is concerned with the 
implementation of the fundamental rights of liberty and social 
rights, of groups and of individuals, for the protection of the 
traditional subjective rights and of new legal situations that need 
 
 
that materializes the harmonious combination of the main state functions 
(legislating, executing the laws and applying them in specific cases).” (S.T.F. − 
PET n. 1.302/DF. rel. Min. Maurício Correa, j. 02.03.2003). 
164 See PONTES DE MIRANDA, 1 COMENTÁRIOS AO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL 
46 (1997) (“[T]he [Brazilian] civil procedure does not distinguish the type of 
right or claim, whether it has a public or private nature, or whether it belongs to 
a public or private party. European jurists, even the most advanced, have not yet 
accepted the civil litigation in a broad sense, which is the Brazilian model, 
which treats public law claims (even constitutional claims) the same way as 
private law claims. The [Brazilian] system recognizes the hierarchy of legal 
norms …, but establishes an equal justice under equal procedural law, except 
insignificant exceptions.”). 
165 See art. 370, caput, (“The judge must, ex officio [sponte sua] or at the request 
of the party, determine what evidence is necessary for a judgment on the 
merits.”), C.P.C, see Teresa Arruda Alvim; Fredie Didier Jr. (coord.) CPC 
Brasileiro para a Língua Inglesa (2017). 
166 See CANDIDO RANGEL DINAMARCO, INSTITUIÇÕES DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL 
CIVIL 168 (2003). This trend will be reduced considerably with the new Code of 
Civil Procedure of 2015. Some examples are the possibility of procedural 
arrangements between the parties and the judge; see, e.g., C.P.C. art. 190 (Braz.) 
(allowing the parties to change the proceeding); see also C.P.C. art. 191 (Braz.) 
(allowing the parties and the judge to elaborate the calendar for the practice of 
procedural acts); see also C.P.C. art 357(3) (stating that in complex cases the 
judge will hold a hearing to hear the parties and build a procedural plan 
together). At the same time, the difference between the public and the private in 
civil procedure is losing its meaning. 
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adequate judicial protection.167 Indeed, Brazil has one of the most 
developed class action systems outside the common law tradition.168 
Slowly, legal reform has directed the Brazilian procedural 
system towards the resolution of repetitive claims and the 
establishment of binding precedents, like appeals to the Superior 
Tribunal of Justice (highest court for infra-constitutional matters) 
and the Supreme Federal Court (highest court for constitutional 
matters).169 Moreover, the bill for the New Code of Civil Procedure 
provides for binding precedents, (Articles 926, 927, 489, § 1º, V and 
VI) and a proceeding for the resolution of repetitive claims (Article 
928).170 
In this aspect, the Brazilian model is a hybrid between civil law 
and common law; precedents in Brazil still have a predominantly 
persuasive character, as is the rule in the civil law tradition. 
However, even before the new Code of Civil Procedure, certain 
types of precedent, such as the ones originating in a “repetitive 
appeal” and súmulas vinculantes (see above), bind the Judiciary and 
the Public Administration as long as the same issues of fact and law 
are involved.171 
Although it is a recent development, even the previous law 
strengthened the normative force of court interpretation; an appeal 
 
 
167 Gidi & Zaneti, Jr., supra note 3, at 252. 
168 ANTONIO GIDI, A CLASS ACTION COMO INSTRUMENTO DE TUTELA COLETIVA 
DOS DIREITOS. AS AÇÕES COLETIVAS EM UMA PERSPECTIVA COMPARADA 
(2007); see also ALUISIO GONÇALVES DE CASTRO MENDES, AÇÕES COLETIVAS 
NO DIREITO COMPARADO E NACIONAL (2009); see also Gidi, supra note 149; see 
also Zaneti & Didier, supra note 149. 
169 See Daniel Mitidiero, The Ideal Court of Last Report A Court of 
Interpretation and Precedent, 5 INT’L JOURNAL OF PROCEDURAL LAW 201-218 
(2015); DANIEL MITIDIERO, CORTES SUPERIORES E CORTES SUPREMAS. DO 
CONTROLE À INTERPRETAÇÃO, DA JURISPRUDENCIA AO PRECEDENTE (2013); 
LUIS GUILHERME MARINONI, O STJ ENQUANTO CORTE DE PRECEDENTES (2013). 
170 See Hermes Zaneti, Jr., IL VALORE VINCOLANTE DEI PRECEDENTI (2014) 
(analyzing binding precedentes); see also HERMES ZANETI, Jr., O VALOR 
VINCULANTE DOS PRECEDENTES: O MODELO GARANTISTA (MG) E A REDUÇÃO 
DA DISCRICIONARIEDADE JUDICIAL: UMA TEORIA DOS PRECEDENTES 
NORMATIVOS FORMALMENTE VINCULANTES (2014); also HERMES ZANETI, JR., 
O VALOR VINCULANTE DOS PRECEDENTES (2019). 
171 See CODIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C. 1973] art. 518(1) (1973) (Braz.); 
CONSTITUIÇÃO DA REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL DE 1988 
[CONSTITUTION], art. 103-103(a). 
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will not be allowed if an opinion is in agreement with a decision 
(súmula) from the Superior Tribunal of Justice or the Supreme 
Federal Court (Article 518(1), CPC/1973) and the organs of the 
public administration are bound by decisions of concentrated 
constitutional control and by súmulas vinculantes from the Supreme 
Federal Court (Articles 103 and 103-A, CF/88).172 
The trend is clearly towards further strengthening the binding 
effect of decisions of superior courts and the techniques for the 
resolution of repetitive litigation.173 The trend is also towards 
strengthening the microsystem of small-claims courts.174 As we will 
see below, in some kinds of small-claims courts there is already a 
mechanism for the resolution of repetitive litigation. The new 
Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure of 2015 increased the power of 
the judge and the parties, but also increased the judges’ 
responsibility and parties’ obligations.175 
The trend is towards a more active control over the duration of 
proceedings and over behavior against objective good faith and 
cooperation.176 The 2015 Code provides sanctions for judges who 
do not decide cases within a reasonable time without justification.177 
These cases may be redistributed to another judge (CPC/2015, Art. 
 
172 See id. 
173 See S.T.F., Pleno, RE n. 655.265/RS, Rel. Min. Luiz Fux, Rel. para Acórdão 
Min. Edson Fachin, j. 13.04.2016; see also STJ, AREsp n. 634.051/SP, Rel. 
Min. Rogério Schietti Cruz, j. em 01.08.2017, DJE 07.08.2017 (“Maintaining 
the factual and normative premises that guided that judgment, the Court's 
conclusions (ratio decidendi) in the said declaratory action are reaffirmed (...) 
The role of the Supreme Court's as an Apex Court requires it to give unity to the 
law and maintain the stability to its precedents”). 
174 See S.T.J., RCD na Rcl 14.730/SP, Rel. Ministro Mauro Campbell Marques, 
Primeira Seção, julgado em 11.02.2015, DJe 24.02.2015 (considering different 
laws as part of a microsystem); FELIPE BOHRING ROCHA. MANUAL DOS 
JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS ESTADUAIS: TEORIA E PRÁTICA 20 (2016). 
175 See Hermes Zaneti Jr., O Princípio da Cooperação e o Código de Processo 
Civil: Cooperação para o Processo. In.: PAULO HENRIQUE DOS SANTOS LUCON; 
JULIANA CORDEIRO DE FARIA; EDGARD AUDOMAR MARX NETO; ESTER CAMILA 
GOMES NORATO REZENDE (ORG.). PROCESSO CIVIL CONTEMPORÂNEO. 
HOMENAGEM AOS 80 ANOS DO PROFESSOR HUMBERTO THEODORO JÚNIOR 142- 
53 (2018). 
176 C.P.C. supra note 171, at art. 4, 5, 6, 12. 
177 See art. 235, (notice to perform the act within ten (10) days, risk of 
administrative sanctions, and, if the inaction persists, the case records are to be 
sent to the legal substitute of the judge to be decided within ten (10) days). 
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235).178 Parties may be sanctioned for not participating in the 
settlement hearing, for abusive appeal, and for contempt of court.179 
The general prohibition of acts against the justice system has been 
timidly applied to sanction behavior against the good faith and 
cooperation.180 This kind of sanction is necessary to encourage a 
change in behavior. 
John Sorabji warned: 
The failure to secure a consistent approach to 
compliance with case management and other 
procedural obligations in England post-1999 
exemplifies this difficulty. If the Brazilian courts are 
to ensure the new CPC’s new case management 
powers and contract procedure operate effectively, 
they are likely to have to take a consistent approach 
to the exercise of those powers and a similar 
approach to non-compliance as the English courts 
have since 2013 finally started to do. If they do not, 
they run the risk of rendering the new forms of case 
management and procedure dead letters: as nothing 
more than the law on the page rather than the law in 
action.181 
 
For example, this new approach of English courts can be 
confirmed in a recent English case, where the unreasonable refusal 




179 See id. at art. 233-35. 
180 See STJ. REsp 1.628.065-MG. Rel. Paulo de Tarso Sanseverino, 3ª T, j. 
02.21.2017; Jornada CEJ/CJF, “Enunciado 148: The reiteration by the creditor 
or debtor of matters already mentioned may give rise to the imposition of a fine 
for conduct contrary to good faith”; STJ, 2.ª Turma, REsp 1.676.027/PR, rel. 
Min. Herman Benjamin, j. 26.09.2017, DJe 11.10.2017 (cooperation principle); 
Frederico Augusto Leopoldino Koehler; Marco Aurélio Ventura Peixoto; 
Silvano José Gomes Flumingnan. Enunciados CJF. Conselho da Justiça Federal. 
Jornadas de Direito Processual Civil 298-99 (2019). 
181 See John Sorabji, Procedural Proportionality and Flexibility in England and 
Brazil, in HERMES ZANETI JR AND MARCO ANTONIO RODRIGUES (EDS.), 
COOPERAÇÃO INTERNACIONAL 588, 588 (2019). 
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failed to respond to an offer to mediate.182 Master O’Hare ordered 
the defendant to pay costs on the indemnity basis from the date it 
failed to respond to an offer to mediate: 
In respect of the defendant’s failure to mediate, I 
think the only sanctions available for me to impose 
are to award costs on the indemnity basis and to 
award interest on those costs from a date earlier than 
today, today being the normal date. I am persuaded 
that the defendant’s refusal to mediate in this case 
was unreasonable […] Case law on this topic is 
largely about penalties imposed on parties who are in 
other respects the successful party. In Halsey v 
Milton Keynes NHS Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576 
and in other cases, penalties were imposed upon 
winners. They do not involve the imposition of 




VII. LAWYER REPRESENTATION AND FREE JUSTICE 
 
So far, we have discussed the heavy burden on the Brazilian 
Judiciary caused by the broad access to justice provided for in the 
Brazilian Constitution and subsequent laws. Because of the increase 
in lawsuits and a growing number of law schools, Brazil has one of 
the highest numbers of lawyers in the world.184 In regular civil 





182 Reid v. Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Tr. [2015] EWHC B21 (U.K.) 
(stating that caselaw is generally about penalties imposed upon winners, not 
losers). 
183 Reid v. Buckinghamshire Healthcare NHS Tr. [2015] EWHC B21 (U.K.) 
184 See INSTITUCIONAL / QUADRO DE ADVOGADOS, OAB NACIONAL, 
https://www.oab.org.br/institucionalconselhofederal/quadroadvogados, 
(accessed on 01/13/2021); LUÍS ROBERTO BARROSO.SEM DATA VENIA. UM 
OLHAR SOBRE O BRASIL E O MUNDO 205 (2020). 
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an attorney is mandatory.185 Self-representation in court is not 
allowed: no one may bring a lawsuit pro se.186 Rather than a 
conscious policy choice, this reality was the result of strong 
lobbying by the Brazilian Bar Association (Ordem dos Advogados 
do Brasil – OAB) during the drafting of the 1988 Constitution.187 
The Brazilian Bar Association actively participated in the process of 
re-democratization of Brazil in the 1980s,188 but as any professional 
association, it, too, has priorities that exclusively support the 
corporative interests of the groups that it represents, even if they are 
not in the best interest of society. Their participation resulted in an 
unprecedented constitutional provision stating that a lawyer was 
‘essential to the administration of justice’.189 Although not essential 
in numerous developed democracies in the world, in Brazil the 
lawyer was made essential by constitutional provision. 
Other important aspects are the expenses and court fees. In 
Brazil, parties must advance the payment of attorney’s fees, court 
fees, and the necessary expenses associated with the production of 
evidence, such as advancing the payment of expert witnesses.190 At 
the end of the proceeding, these costs will be reimbursed by the 
losing party (fee-shifting).191 But this general rule has important 
exceptions. Contrary to the rule in ordinary proceedings, in small- 
claims courts the parties do not have to pay any court costs and there 
 
 
185 C.P.C. 2015, supra note 154, at art. 103; see also Neil Montgomery and 
Helena Calderano, Regulation of the legal profession in Brazil: overview, 
THOMPSON REUTERS PRACTICAL L. (Apr. 1, 2018), 
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/8-637-9911. 
186 See id. 
187 See Gary M. Reich, The 1988 Constitution a Decade Later: Ugly 
Compromises Reconsidered, 40 J. OF INTERAMERICAN STUD. AND WORLD AFF. 
5, 5-6 (1998). 
188 See LILIA SCHWARCZ AND HELOISA STARLING, BRASIL. UMA BIOGRAFIA 
469-70, 476 and 495 (2015) (discussing that the Brazilian Bar Association 
(OAB) participated in the official 1978 meetings to prepare the transition from 
dictatorship to a democratic government, in the acts against the torture and in the 
resumption of habeas corpus during the dictatorship, and in the impeachment of 
President Fernando Collor in 1992). 
189 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 133. (“The lawyer is 
indispensable to the administration of justice.”) 
190 C.P.C. 2015, supra note 154, at art. 82-84. 
191 Id. at art. 85. 
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is no fee-shifting.192 This rule is valid only in the first instance, not 
on appeal.193 The same rules apply in class actions: no court fees and 
no fee-shifting.194 Additionally, there is full legal aid available for 
individuals and companies that need financial support.195 
Those considered “in need” under the law qualify to be 
represented by Public Defenders.196 The Public Defenders are 
chosen in a highly selective public exam and appointed for life.197 
The Public Defenders must give legal advice and judicial 
representation in all instances of the court system to people “in 
need.”198 
Slowly, all states have been creating State Public Defenders.199 
In the federal sphere, the Federal Government created the Federal 
Public Defenders (Defensoria Publica da Uniao).200 Although the 
goal of full legal aid has not yet been fulfilled,201 law reform and 
increased investment indicate considerable progress. 
In a region without Public Defenders, the role of lawyers for the 
poor may be exercised by court-appointed attorneys.202 Even if the 
parties are represented by private attorneys of their choice (paid or 




192 Lei Nº 9.099, de 26 de Setembro de 1995, art. 54 (Braz.). 
193 Id. at art. 55. 
194 Id. 
195 C.P.C. 2015 supra note 154, at art. 185. 
196 Supra note 193 at art. 5º (“the State shall provide full and free-of-charge legal 
assistance to all who prove insufficiency of funds”) and 134 (“The Public Legal 
Defence is a permanent institution, essential to the jurisdictional function of the 
State, and is responsible primarily (…) the full and free-of-charge defence, in all 
levels, both judicially and extrajudicially, of individual and collective rights of 
the needy.”). 
197 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION], art. 134. 
198 Id. 
199 A Defensoria Pública, MAPA DA DEFENSORIA PUBLICA NO BRASIL, 
https://www.ipea.gov.br/sites/en-GB/mapadefensoria (last visited Jan. 23, 2021). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. (citing to a 2013 study that demonstrated a lack of public defenders in 
72% of Brazilian districts, which means that the public defenders are present in 
only 754 of the 2,680 districts. 
202 C.P.C. 2015 supra note 154, at art. 72 (“If there is no Public Defender in the 
area, the judge must invest a lawyer in that function”). 
203 Id. at art. 98-102. 
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court fees will be waived and that they will not be liable for the 
attorney’s fee-shifting if they lose.204 
This reality demonstrates how the Brazilian Justice system 
constantly invests in a system of comprehensive and free legal aid 
for people in need, a direction that is directly against the world trend 
of austerity. There is the risk of arriving at a completely free 
judiciary for litigants. But since there is no free lunch, a judiciary 
entirely dispensed by public entities must be entirely financed by 
taxes paid by citizens. But, this may not be a sustainable recipe in 
the long run, as the European reality has demonstrated.205 
It is undeniable that Brazil needs to broaden its judicial 
protection to people in need, and the country is far from providing 
the comprehensive and free access to justice that it has promised. 
However, there must be control and excesses must be avoided, so 
that the expenses do not soar out of control and bring about a 
reduction in the protection of fundamental rights. An out of control 
and unplanned expansion may lead to setbacks in the future, as is 
the situation in Europe now.206 Moreover, as we have mentioned 
before, the main problem of the backlog in the Brazilian judicial 
system results from a deficit in the public service and in consumer 
protection, which can be corrected by the Public Administration and 
by regulatory agencies, which double the expenditure of 
maintaining the judicial structure for the protection of these 
rights.207 Therefore, the Brazilian Supreme Court has recently 
demanded that a plaintiff bring his or her claim administratively, in 
the Social Security administrative agency, before having access to 
the Judiciary (RE 631.240/MG).208 This requirement is not a major 
obstacle to access to justice, but is necessary to force the Public 





204 Id. (demonstrating the efficient lobby of the public defenders in Congress). 
205 See Xandra Kramer & Shusuke Kakiuchi, Austerity in Civil Procedure and 
the Role of Simplified Procedures, 8 ERASMUS L. REV. 139, 145-46 (2015). 
206 See HAZEL GENN, JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE 51 (2010) (explaining the “sorry 
state of the civil courts” as and effect of “the resources allocated to the courts”). 
207 No. 631.240, de 9 de Março de 2014, RECURSO EXTRAORDINARIO MINAS 
GERAIS [R.E.M.G.] de 3.9.2014 (Braz.). 
208 Id. 
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VIII THE AVAILABLE SIMPLIFIED PROCEEDINGS: SMALL-CLAIMS 
COURTS, MONITORY ACTION, IN LIMINE JUDGMENT, & REDUCED 
INVOLVEMENT OF COURTS IN FAMILY LAW AND WILLS 
As a result of the Republican Pact mentioned above, several 
changes in the Brazilian procedural system towards more efficient 
and speedy procedures were introduced. These changes were 
repeated in the new Civil Procedure Code enacted in 2015.209 
The laws reduced the need for court involvement in family law, 
wills, and notary activities, which led to a de-bureaucratization of 
several proceedings like insolvency of companies, changes in public 
registry, probate, and divorce.210 These proceedings were once of 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Judiciary, but since 2007 may be 
decided administratively by a Notary Public, as long as the parties 
are in agreement and there is no interest of minors involved.211 This 
process avoids unnecessarily long and costly judicial proceedings to 
resolve consensual matters. Yet, contradictorily, the presence of an 
attorney is still mandatory,212 which may increase costs 
unnecessarily in simple proceedings. 
Yet another relevant factor in the Brazilian legislation is the 
creation of small-claims courts, inspired by the American 
experience.213 They have jurisdiction to decide cases of less 
complexity, giving more freedom to the parties and more procedural 
powers to the judge.214 
There is a microsystem of three small-claims courts created by 
three statutes enacted within 15 years: state small-claims courts (Lei 
9.099/1995), federal small-claims courts (Lei 10.259/01), and small- 
claims courts for claims against the Administration (Lei 
 
 
209 See generally, C.P.C. 2015, supra note 154. 
210 See Lei Nº 11.441, de 4 de Janeiro de 2007. 
211 Id. 
212 Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 103, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.) (available in English: https://dpsionline.co.uk/wp- 
content/uploads/2019/06/Brazilian-Code-of-Civil-Procedure.pdf). 
213 See OVIDIO BAPTISTA DA SILVA, JUIZADO DE PEQUENAS CAUSAS (1985); 
FELIPE BORRING ROCHA, MANUAL DOS JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS ESTADUAIS 
3-9 (2012) (discussing the history of the small-claims courts, originally created 
in Brazil in 1984 by Law 7.244). 
214 See Candido Rangel, Dinamarco, INSTITUIÇÕES DE DIREITO PROCESSUAL 
(2003). 
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12.153/09).215 These three statutes have similarities and differences, 
but they complement each other, creating an integrated legal system 
of procedural norms that are subsidiary to each other. The Code of 
Civil Procedure is used only in the absence of a specific rule in the 
microsystem.216 
Moreover, there are principles of procedure that are specific to 
the small-claims courts: orality, simplicity, informality, procedural 
economy and speed, and constant incentive to settle.217 The law 
inaugurated a new paradigm in Brazilian procedural law when it 
allowed the federal and state government to settle claims. 
Despite the subsidiarity and common principles, there is no 
uniformity in the three types of small-claims courts as the courts 
have different rules.218 One of the many differences between the 
three types of small-claims courts in Brazil is subject-matter 
jurisdiction. The Civil Claims Small-Claims Courts (Juizados 
Especiais Cíveis) decide civil claims up to forty times the monthly 
minimum wage (about $12,600).219 Its jurisdiction is limited to 
cases of less complexity, such as summary proceeding cases. The 
two Public Claims Small-Claims Courts, both federal and state 
(Juizados Especiais Federais and Juizados Especiais da Fazenda 
Publica), decide public claim cases up to sixty times the monthly 
minimum wage (about $18,900) and are not limited to cases of less 
complexity.220 
The repetition of the word “claim” in our English translation of 
the small-claims court’s names is not inadvertent. One small-claims 
court has jurisdiction over “civil claims” (which are claims of a 
private nature) and two small-claims courts have jurisdiction over 
 
215 Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de 
Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.). 
216 Felipe Borring Rocha, MANUAL DOS JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS ESTADUAIS 
(2012). 
217 Id. 
218 See FELIPE CAMILO DALL-ALBA, CURSO DE JUIZADOS ESPECIALS: JUIZADO 
ESPECIAL CIVEL, JUIZADO ESPECIAL FEDERAL E JUIZADO ESPECIAL DA FAZENDA 
PUBLICA (2011) (offering a comprehensive comparison between all types of 
small claims courts in Brazil). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
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“public claims” (which are claims of a public nature against the 
states and the federal government).221 
Another difference between the three types of small-claims 
courts in Brazil is whether their jurisdiction is exclusive, i.e. whether 
the use of the small-claims court is mandatory. Most scholars say 
that the jurisdiction of the Civil Claims Small-Claims Courts is 
relative (not exclusive), i.e. the plaintiff may choose between 
bringing a claim there or in the regular courts.222 If the claim is over 
the jurisdictional amount (forty times the monthly minimum wage), 
the plaintiff may still bring his or her claim in the Civil Claims 
Small-Claims Courts, but in that case, the plaintiff waives the 
amount over the jurisdictional limit.223 In the two Public Claims 
Small-Claims Courts, both federal and state, the statute is clear: the 
jurisdiction is absolute (exclusive).224 Therefore, any claim over the 
jurisdictional amount must be brought in the regular courts. 
Another difference between the three types of small-claims 
courts in Brazil is that each statute lists subject matters that are 
excluded.225 For example, neither of these three small-claims courts 
have jurisdiction to decide class action cases, regardless of the value 
of the claim or the complexity of the subject matter.226 
 
221 Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de 
Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.). 
222 See FERNANDO DA COSTA TOURINHO NETO & JOEL DIAS FIGUEIRA 
JÚNIOR, JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS E CRIMINAIS: COMENTÁRIOS À LEI N. 
9.099/1995 89 (2017); see also Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, 
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.). 
223 See FERNANDO DA COSTA TOURINHO NETO & JOEL DIAS 
FIGUEIRA JÚNIOR, JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS E CRIMINAIS: 
COMENTÁRIOS À LEI N. 
9.099/1995 89 (2017); see also Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, 
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.). 
224 See JOEL DIAS FIGUEIRA JÚNIOR AND FERNANDO DA COSTA 
TOURINHO NETO. JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS E CRIMINAIS: 
COMENTÁRIOS À LEI N. 
9.099/1995 89 (2017); see also Lei No. 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001 (Braz.); 
Lei No. 12,153, de 22 de Dezembro de 2009 (Braz.). 
225 Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de 
Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.). 
226 See Enunciado Nº 139 do FONAJEF, AJUFE (The exclusion of the 
jurisdiction of the Special Courts System as regards demands on diffuse or 
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There are also structural differences between the three types of 
small-claims courts. All of them have three main professionals: (i) 
judges (usually from the same judicial career of the regular judges 
and selected in the same entrance exam); (ii) lay judges (graduated 
in law, but not in the judicial career); and (iii) mediators (specifically 
trained to hold conciliation sessions between the parties).227 
Another difference between the three types of small-claims 
courts in Brazil is the need for legal representation. Contrary to the 
general rule in civil and criminal litigation228, in small-claims courts 
the parties do not need to be represented by lawyers.229 Initially, 
lawyers reacted negatively to this rule, so the older statute is more 
timid than the newer ones. 
In the Civil Claims Small-Claims Courts (the older statute), the 
parties do not need to be represented by lawyers in claims below 
twenty times the monthly minimum wage (approximately $6,300 
USD), but a lawyer is essential in claims between twenty and forty 
times the monthly minimum wage.230 In the two Public Claims 
Small-Claims Courts, both the federal and the state, which are the 
most recent statutes, plaintiffs do not need to be represented by 
 
collective rights or interests, including homogeneous individuals, applies both to 
individual demands of a multitudinous nature and to collective actions.). MARIA 
DO CARMO HONÓRIO; ERICK LINHARES; GUILHERME RIBEIRO BALDAN (ORGS.). 
OS ENUNCIADOS DO FONAGE E SEUS FUNDAMENTOS 79 (2019). 
227 Id. 
228 Lei Nº 8.906, de 4 de Julho de 1994, Art. 1, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 5.7.1994 (Braz.). 
229 Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, Art. 9, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.) (“In claims of value up to twenty minimum 
wages, the parties will appear in person and may be assisted by a lawyer; in 
claims of higher value, legal assistance is mandatory”); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de 
Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 
12.153 de 22 de Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
23.12.2009 (Braz.) (The Supreme Court ruled considering constitutional the 
self-representation limited to civil matters in small claims courts). 
230 Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, Art. 9, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.) (“In claims of value up to twenty minimum 
wages, the parties will appear in person and may be assisted by a lawyer; in 
claims of higher value, legal assistance is mandatory”); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de 
Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 
12.153 de 22 de Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
23.12.2009 (Braz.) (The Supreme Court ruled considering constitutional the 
self-representation limited to civil matters in small claims courts). 
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lawyers regardless of the size of their claim.231 This statute generates 
a situation of inequality because the government, on the defense 
side, will always be represented by its own lawyers. Legal 
representation is mandatory in appealing all three types of small- 
claims courts. Moreover, on appeal, except in case of legal aid, the 
parties will have to pay court fees and attorneys’ fees to the 
winner.232 
In order to protect its market share, the Brazilian Bar 
Association (OAB) filed several direct actions before the Supreme 
Court challenging the constitutionality of the provisions waiving 
attorney representation in small-claims courts. The OAB argued that 
the mandatory representation by lawyers in all civil matters was an 
essential part of the Brazilian justice system. The argument was 
based on an ambiguous language of the Brazilian Constitution, 
which says, in part, that “the lawyer is indispensable to the 
administration of justice.”233 It is at most debatable that this 
language means that attorney representation is essential to every 
lawsuit. Most likely, it is merely an aspirational or inspirational 
language, repeated with other words when the Constitution refers to 
Public Prosecutors234 and Public Defenders235. The Supreme Court, 
therefore, has consistently ruled that access to justice, informality, 
orality and other principles of the small claims courts justify self- 
representation.236 
 
231 Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] 
de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.). 
232 Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] 
de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.). 
233 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Art. 133 (Braz.) (“The 
lawyer is indispensable to the administration of justice, and they are inviolable 
by their acts and manifestations in the exercise of the profession, in the limits of 
the law.”). 
234 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Art. 127 (Braz.) (“The 
Office of the Public Prosecutors is a permanent institution, essential to the 
jurisdictional function of the State…”). 
235 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] Art. 134 (Braz.) (“The 
Public Defenders is a permanent institution, essential to the jurisdictional 
function of the State…”). 
236 S.T.F., ADI 1539, Relator: Min. Maurício Corrêa, 24.4.2003, SUPREMO 
TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDÊNCIA [S.T.F.J.] (Braz.); S.T.F., ADI 3168, 
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The protection of urgent matters (including anticipatory 
decision) is expressly allowed in both the federal and state Public 
Claims Small-Claims Courts (with the possibility of interlocutory 
appeal of the decision).237 The law regarding the Civil Claims 
Small-Claims Courts does not provide this protection expressly. 
Therefore, the protection of urgent matters is only allowed by 
interpretation of the Constitution, which provides for a general 
power for provisional matters and anticipation of the final decision 
(Article 5, XXXV, CF/88).238 Appeal of the final judgment, 
however, is allowed in all three small-claims courts to be decided by 
a panel of three first instance judges.239 The appeal only has a 
devolutive effect (i.e. no suspensive effect), but the judge may stay 
the proceeding to avoid irreversible damage.240 
One of the most interesting features of the proceedings in small- 
claims courts is the possibility of uniformization of the decisions of 
the appeal panels through the resolution of repetitive appeals.241 
 
Relator: Joaquim Barbosa, 08.06.2006, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL 
JURISPRUDÊNCIA [S.T.F.J.] (Braz.). 
237 Dall-Alba, supra note 218. 
238 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION], Art. 5 (XXXV) (Braz.); see 
HERMES ZANETI JR., A CONSTITUCIONALIZAÇÃO DO PROCESSO. O MODELO 
CONSTITUCIONAL DA JUSTIÇA BRASILEIRA E AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE PROCESSO E 
CONSTITUIÇÃO 145 (2014); see also, e.g., S.T.F., ADPF 172 MC-REF, Relator: 
Min. Marco Aurélio, 06.10.2009, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL 
JURISPRUDÊNCIA [S.T.F.J.] (Braz.). 
239 Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de 
Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.). 
240 Lei Nº 9.099, de 18 de Setembro de 1995, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 27.9.1995 (Braz.); Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153 de 22 de 
Dezembro de 2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.). 
241 This proceeding was inspired by the German model proceeding 
(Musterverfahren), although some commentators also compare it with the 
English Group Litigation Order (GLO). See Antonio do Passo Cabral, O Novo 
Procedimento-Modelo (Musterverfahren) Alemão: Uma Alternativa às Ações 
Coletivas, 147 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 123 (2007); see Antonio Adonias A. 
Bastos, A Estabilidade das Decisões Judiciais Como Elemento Contributivo 
para o Acesso à Justiça e para o Desenvolvimento Econômico, 227 REVISTA DE 
PROCESSO 295 (2014); Guilherme Rizzo Amaral, Efetividade, Segurança, 
Massificação e a Proposta de um ‘Incidente de Resolução de Demandas 
Repetitivas’, 196 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 237 (2011); Antonio do Passo Cabral, 
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Curiously, the proceeding for uniformization of appellate decisions 
is not uniform in the three small-claims courts: each one has its own 
proceeding. 
In the Federal and State Public Claims Small-Claims Court, for 
example, it is possible to request uniformization of interpretation of 
federal law whenever there is a conflict in the appellate panels 
relating to substantive law.242 The uniformization may be regional 
or national (Law 10.259/2001 Article 14 and Law 12.153/2009, 
Articles 18 and 19).243 
There is no specific provision of uniformization in the statute 
regulating the Civil Claims Small-Claims Court,244 but whenever 
there is a conflict of interpretation between the appellate panels, the 
parties may take the case to the Brazilian Supreme Court (Superior 
Tribunal de Justica – STJ).245 A bill was proposed to provide a 
National Uniformization Panel to provide a proceeding similar to 
the Public Claims Small-Claims Courts (Bill 5.741/2013).246 There 
was a strong reaction to this project, however, especially from an 
institution that represents the small-claims courts (FONAJE): with 
a backlog of millions of cases, this Bill will only bring delays 
 
 
A Escolha da Causa-Piloto nos Incidentes de Resolução de Processos 
Repetitivos, 231 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 201 (2014); Dierle Nunes, Novo 
Enfoque para as Tutelas Diferenciadas no Brasil? Diferenciação Procedimental 
a Partir da Diversidade de Litigiosidades, 180 REVISTA DE PROCESSO 109 
(2010). 
242 Lei Nº 10.259, Art. 14, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 13.7.2001 (Braz.); Lei Nº 12.153, Art. 18-19, de 22 de Dezembro de 
2009, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 23.12.2009 (Braz.). 
243 Lei Nº 10.259, de 12 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] 
de 13.7.2001 (Braz.). 
244 See Rocha, supra note 216, at 260-61. 
245 The appellate system of small claims courts is unnecessarily complex. STJ, 
AgRg nos EDEcl no PUI n. 694/SP, Rel. Min. Reynaldo Soares da Fonseca, 
Terceira Seção, v.u., DJE 2.4.2018. Now the issue is left to state courts to apply 
the caselaw from STJ. Some state courts have created panels of uniformization 
exclusively to decide cases against the caselaw from STJ. See, e.g., Turma de 
Uniformização de Interpretação de Lei, 
http://www.tjes.jus.br/institucional/coordenadorias/institucionalcoordenadoriasj 
uizados-especiais-civeis-e-criminais/decisoes-da-turma-de-uniformizacao/. 
246 See Projeto De Lei 5741/2013, Camara dos Deputados, 
https://www.camara.leg.br/proposicoesWeb/fichadetramitacao?idProposicao=58 
0322 (last visited Mar. 24, 2021). 
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without any significant improvement.247 The Bill was withdrawn in 
2015. The main arguments against the bill were: (i) in practice, only 
major corporations will be able to finance the uniformization 
proceeding; (ii) the uniformization panels will stop the natural 
maturation of the subject debated in the several first and second 
instance courts; and (iii) the uniformization panels would be the 
sixth degree of jurisdiction, increasing the time and effort to decide 
conflicts and violating the main principles of economy and 
efficiency in small-claims courts.248 Although the bill was not 
enacted, the CPC/15 provided that the Small Claims Courts are 
bound by second instance decisions from the “incident for the 
resolution of repetitive cases” (IRDR) (CPC/2015, art. 985).249 
Additionally, the new procedural system has provided for binding 
precedents.250 
Another important development is the so-called “monitory 
action.”251 The Brazilian monitory action is available to pursue any 
kind of obligations: pay money, deliver things, to do or refrain from 
doing a certain act.252 The creditor only needs written evidence of 
his or her right to obtain a subpoena.253 The debtor must pay, deliver, 
 
247 See Mais de 100 projetos querem mudar funcionamento de juizados 




249 Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 985, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.). 
250 See HERMES ZANETI JR., O VALOR VINCULANTE DOS PRECEDENTES. TEORIA 
DOS PRECEDENTES NORMATIVOS FORMALMENTE VINCULANTES (forthcoming 
2021). 
251 Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 700, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.) (“An action for the execution of an unenforceable 
instrument may be filed by whoever alleges, on the basis of written 
unenforceable evidence, that he or she has a right to claim, from a competent 
debtor: I – the payment of a sum of money; II – the delivery of a fungible or 
non-fungible thing or of movable or immovable property; III – the performance 
of an obligation to do or not to do.”). 
252 Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 700, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.). 
253 See CANDIDO RANGEL DINAMARCO, A REFORMA DO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO 
CIVIL 230 (1995); see JOSE ROGERIO CRUZ E TUCCI, AÇÃO MONITÓRIA (1997) 
(discussing the monitory action in Brazil); EDUARDO TALAMINI, TUTELA 
MONITÓRIA: A AÇÃO MONITÓRIA (2001); LUIZ GUILHERME MARINONI & 
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do, or refrain from doing within 15 days.254 If the debtor does not 
present a defense, the creditor obtains an “executive judicial title” 
and may enforce it in court (CPC/2015, Articles 700, 701 and 
702).255 
The monitory proceeding is not mandatory: the creditor may 
choose the traditional civil proceeding,256 but the monitory 
proceeding offers advantages for the creditor (who may have his or 
her claim satisfied quickly) and for the debtor (who may have costs 
and attorney’s fees waived if the request is complied with). 
Despite the similarities, the structure and scope of the Brazilian 
monitory proceedings are different from the “European order for 
payment procedure” (Regulation 1896/2006), an injunctive 
proceeding for payment that is more effective than its Brazilian 
counterpart to obtain the practical result in a reasonable amount of 
time and the de-bureaucratization of the justice system.257 The 
 
DANIEL MITIDIERO, CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL: COMENTADO ARTIGO POR 
ARTIGO (2008);Hermes Zaneti, JR., and Rodrigo Mazzei, Ação Monitória: 
Primeiras Impressões Após a Lei n. 11.232/05, in PAULO HOFFMAN AND 
LEONARDO FERRES DA SILVA RIBEIRO (EDS.), PROCESSO DE EXECUÇÃO CIVIL: 
MODIFICAÇÕES DA LEI 11.232/05 249-74 (2006); Hermes Zaneti, JR., and 
Rodrigo Mazzei, Ação Monitória: Primeiras Impressões Após a Lei n. 
11.232/05, in PAULO HOFFMAN AND LEONARDO FERRES DA SILVA RIBEIRO 
(EDS.), PROCESSO DE EXECUÇÃO CIVIL: MODIFICAÇÕES DA LEI 11.232/05 249-74 
(2006). The monitory action generated a rich practical and theoretical debate, 
resulting in the enactment of several ‘Judicial Statements’ (Súmulas n. 233, 282, 
299, 339) from the Brazilian Supreme Court (Superior Tribunal de Justica). See 
HEITOR SICA, 10 COMENTÁRIOS AO CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL 142-53 (2018) 
(discussing arts. 674 to 718 of the CPC/15). 
254 Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 701, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.) 
255 Id. at Art. 700-02. 
256 Id. at Art. 700. 
257 See generally, European Order for Payment Procedure, EUR. PARL. DOC. 
(COM 1896) (2006). 
(“The regulation, which has applied since 2008, establishes a European 
procedure for orders for payment. The procedure simplifies, speeds up, and 
reduces the costs of litigation in cross-border cases concerning uncontested 
pecuniary claims. The regulation permits the free circulation of European orders 
for payment throughout European Union (EU) countries by laying down 
minimum standards, compliance with which renders unnecessary any 
intermediate proceedings in the EU country of enforcement prior to recognition 
and enforcement. (...) The European order for payment procedure applies to civil 
and commercial matters in cross-border cases, whatever the nature of the court 
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European order for payment has been applicable since 2008 in civil 
and commercial matters, independently of the type of court.258 The 
country needs profound law reforms that change the structure of 
legal proceedings, even with unwanted collateral effects. Although 
we need to preserve the procedural guarantees, they must be adapted 
to the current needs of society. This shift is underway. 
Finally, there is the in limine judgment against the plaintiff 
whenever the issue to be decided is a legal matter and the court has 
previously decided a similar issue in a binding precedent.259 In such 
cases, the defendants do not need to be served with process for the 
court to decide the case on the merits against the plaintiff.260 If the 
plaintiff appeals, the judge will have five days to reconsider his or 
her decision.261 Only then will the defendant be served with process 
to present an answer to the appeal (CPC/2015, Article 332).262 
 
IX. “AGE OF AUSTERITY” IN BRAZILIAN CIVIL JUSTICE? A 
NEEDED BALANCE 
Brazil has always had experience with living under the austerity 
necessity because it has always been a country without adequate 
resources and deeply ingrained social inequality. But the current 
“Era of Austerity” or “financial crisis” (austerity-control) has finally 




or tribunal. A cross-border case is one in which at least one of the parties is 
domiciled or habitually resident in an EU country other than the country of the 
court hearing the action. The regulation applies to all EU countries except 
Denmark.”) 
258 Id. 
259 Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 332, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.) (“In cases that waive the evidentiary stage, the 
judge, regardless of the service of summons upon the defendant, shall deny, on a 
preliminary basis, any claim that contradicts: I – a precedent established by the 
Federal Supreme Court or by the Superior Court of Justice (…) § 2 If an appeal 
proper is not filed, the defendant shall be notified of the res judicata judgment, 
under art. 241.”). 
260 Lei Nº 13.105, Art. 332, de 16 de Março de 2015, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 17.3.2015 (Braz.). 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
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and early 2020,263 and the decrease affected the behavior of the 
government through the Judiciary and incumbent expenses. As we 
have demonstrated, after decades concerned exclusively with 
efficiency and legal certainty, Brazil woke up for fiscal adjustment 
and the balance of the accounts of the Judiciary. 
Court fees have recently risen, several bills try to address the 
free justice system, and a broad Employment Law Reform show 
concern for austerity measures.264 The unfortunate consequence is 
that it all means fewer rights and less access to justice, which may 
affect constitutional guarantees. 
As a general criticism, it is clear that several deficiencies in 
Brazil overburden the Judiciary and generate a structural 
inefficiency of the system. For example, the ideal of ‘free justice,’ 
the fact that certain proceedings designed to facilitate the 
administration of justice are not mandatory (such as some kinds of 
small-claims courts), as well as the historic need to provide the 
population with basic fundamental rights (such as health, education, 
environment, honest administration, and respect of consumers). 
The country adopted an extremely loose vision of the access to 
justice as an individual right that is absolute and nonwaivable (droit 
indisponible). The Judiciary was not seen merely as a regular public 
service, Therefore, legislative solutions ended up worsening the 
problem, and creating what we can identify as an Era of Indulgence. 
In the Era of Indulgence, money is wasted and access to justice is 
not obtained because of the judiciary backlog generated by the broad 
access to justice. Moreover, the backlog overburdens the public 
coffers with unnecessary expenses. The government is using the 
Justice in Numbers report to address these issues.265 
 
 
263 Brazil Overview, WORLD BANK, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil/overview (last updated Oct. 14, 
2019). 
264 See https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2018/07/05/austeridade- 
economica-prejudica-politicas-sociais-afirmam-debatedores (meeting held at 
Senate, criticizing the social impacts of the austerity policies). 
265 See CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTICA, https://www.cnj.jus.br/pesquisas- 
judiciarias/justica-em-numeros/ (arguing that the Justice in Number Report is 
the most important source of oficial statistics since 2004 and it is used as 
indicators and tool of analysis to the management of the Judicial branch) (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2021). 
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Only recently did the legislature start to reduce the unrestricted 
access to justice through filters on appeals, mandatory simplified 
proceedings, aggregation of repetitive cases (test cases), binding 
precedents, etc. This restriction was done, however, not to obtain the 
economy, but to obtain efficiency and legal certainty. It is hoped, 
however, that these law reforms will also represent a reduction in 
the costs of the public machinery. 
Despite the enormous effort in recent years to obtain empirical 
data and judicial statistics, the research conducted is insufficient to 
make a complete and accurate evaluation of the performance of the 
Judiciary. Future research will certainly allow a more precise 
evaluation of its performance and will allow verification of whether 
the current law reforms have been successful. 
For the time being, in Brazil, we spend more money without 
obtaining a proportional increase in the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the judicial system—this reality is the general picture of the 
Brazilian Justice System so far. We believe that, with the new-found 
focus in the management of the Judiciary, this reality may begin to 
change. One may see a slow decrease in costs and litigiousness. We 
hope, however, that this goal may be obtained without a reduction 
in the quality of service of justice, the protection of human rights, 
and the access to justice, particularly of those in need. 
